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In every society there are individuals or groups of people who have 
the power to control, or at least direct, various resources.. Resources, 
an ambiguous term, can mean anything from monetary supplies to legislative 
sanctions to different objects or opportunities.. Just <18 there will be 
individuals controlling these assets, there will also be groups perceiving 
and expressing discontent. For example, these people may be dissatisfied 
with the power groups' methods of leadership; they may perceive their needs 
to be neglected and/or they may want to seize control of these assets and 
channel resources into their own hands for the betterment of their group. 
One might even understand this inevitable aspect of conflict in society 
as part of a continuing reinforcement of the status quo which functions to 
enhance what the particular society has designated [IS 'natural'. I\s a 
society allows people to voice their protests and malcontent, a power 
structure is in a position to display its strength by repressing their 
actions and words and then punishing, them by ignoring them or by coopting 
members of the group or the group's demands into the authority structure. 
The issue of conflict is essential for an understanding of social organization, 
for as William Gamson notes, lIa system cannot function effectively if it 
must devote too much of its resources to problems of integration and conflict 
management. "I Conflict is built into a system which can only handle a certain 
number of demands; some people will always be dissatisfied. The point then 
is that there are two vantage points - the pe.rspective frol'l the challenge group 
which s-eeks to exert influence and the authority perspective which seeks 
to contain conflict and maintain a stable society. 
I shall, in the course of this paper, offer a multi-dimensional analysis 
of two challenge groups, the National Woman's Party (NWP) and the National 
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Women's Trade Union League (NWTUL). On one level, 1 will use the Sociology 
of Knowledge as a methodology to get at the existential social factors 
operating on and functioning as constraints upon individuals involved in 
these groups during the Progressive Era. How did the specific ideology 
and economic and social relations of this time period shape ideas and actions 
as well as constrain individuals from creating unmanageable conflict? To 
this purpose, I will discuss various important aspects of this time period: 
the creation of a new middle class and the economic, social and political 
climate of the Progressive period, from approximately 1900-1920. Moreover, 
how did authorities react to various groups' strategies and what factors 
determined these responses? After a discussion of the evolution of the 
National Woman's Party and the the National Women's Trade Union League, I 
will compare movement variables of these groups by placing them in their 
historical context and by analyzing their relative successes and failures 
in terms of publ ic (lc('.('ptnnc0 and :Hlthori.ty conrf'ssion. ThesE' variables 
include organizational structure, membership, strategy, ideology and 
leadership. 
Every protest group trying to attain a degree of power must define their 
struggle in terms of the amount of influence they hope to exert onto the 
power structure. Influence is defined as the "degree of probability change 
in the desired direction." 2 One cannot necessarily calculate the amount of 
influence by a measure of the literal acceptance of the group's demands; the 
issue is much more complicated. Political influence may be analyzed not 
only in terms of immediate fulfillment of demands but of the creation of new 
resources that benefit the conflict group as well. 
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Just as the group's target of influence (the power structure) has 
resources, so too must the group acknowledge and consolidate their resources 
and cllannel them into areas most consisLent with their ideals and slrategy. 
The perception factor, what they feel will most likely be successful, is 
therefore quite important, for a group may have resources of which they 
are not aware or choose not to utilize. 
William Gamson outlines three means ul influences, cunstraint, inducement 
and persuasion. Constraint is used to add new disadvantages or to threaten 
the possibility of the same (i.e., strikes, boycotts, etc.). Inducements are 
the addition of new advantages (money, bribery) or the relinquishment of a 
group's control of a resource (i.e. information). It could also be the 
promise of future support as well. Persuasion seeks to change attitudes 
of authorities without adding or taking anything away from their situation. 
Through persuasion, group members seek to convince their targets of influence 
that their alternative is preferable to what was previously thought to be 
correct .. 3 
As mentioned above, protest groups tend to reinforce the power group's 
potency and force by advocating that individuals voice complaints through 
established·, though not always legitimate, societal channels. There are, 
however, definite limits to the extent to which they can carry their protests. 
Various theorists from different premises, have explained these limits. 
Roberta Ash, a NeD-Marxist, enunciates how a variety of ideologies can be 
associated with a single sub-structure and that different movements can 
change certain aspects of a society's ideology without affecting its substructure, 
which, from her viewpoint, is the class-oriented means of production. However, 
she maintains that ideological flexibility is limited and that protest groups 
will fail when they seek ideological transformation dissonant with the existing 
substructure. The more a movement threatens the means -'of production which 
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is the basic economic relation, the more resistance the group will encounter. 
The threat to the stability and survival of the state is simply too great. 
Nevertheless, it is not enough to analyze, in a one-sided fashion, 
pointing to protest~group members to predict influence and success. Authority 
control of discontent is equally integral to the issues of power and conflict. 
How does a society contain discontent and what methods are to be used as 
means of social control'? A typical regulating response is to remove the 
protest group's pressure either by yielding ground, by modifying their 
decision, or by exerting counter-influence. In still another way, authorities 
can regulate group members' access to resources. The power group can also 
play one challenge group against another which may, consequently, cancel out 
their strengths. Cooptation, however, is the most effective control as it 
entails absorbing the group into the existing ~trllcturc. This appeasement 
consists of subjecting them to legitimate rewards and punishments of the 
system and promoting identification with society's collective interests. 
Gamson goes on to systematically predict attempts at influence by the 
protest group. He states that the more a group is affected by an issue, the 
more likely they will be to exert influence. Furthermore, the greater the 
amount of resources under a group's control, and the more fluid the resources, 
(in terms of accessibility and manipulation), the higher the probability of a 
group's attempt at influence. 1n short, a confident group with goals more 
compatible with the system in power, will most likely rely on persuasion. 
A neutral group will use inducements to prevent the outbreak of hostility 
and an alienated group, having the least to lose, will use constraints. 4 
One can clearly see then a two-sided transaction consisting of various 
groups extending influence .in a Democratic society and their counterposition 
to the power structure which, acting from certain existential factors, responds 
rhetorically or actively to group actions. However, is it enough to examine 
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various factors and authority responses without investigating the historical 
situation out of which these events are growing? Obviously not, for the 
nature and content of a group's actions J ideologies, and membership make-up 
is intimately connected to a prevailing majority consciousness which is linked 
to historical conditions occurring simultaneously, in the past, or in the 
future, the threat of which makes it impossible to ignore. The sociology 
of knowledge: 
"is primarily concerned with the relations between knowledge 
and other existential factors in the society or culture. 
With increasing social conflict, differences in the values, 
attitudes and modes of thought of groups develop to the point 
where the orientation which these groups previously had in common 
is overshadowed by incompatible differences ... the co-existence 
of these conflicting perspectives leads to an active and 
reciprocal distrust between groups. 115 
In an advanced industrial and multi-ideological society, no one statement is 
palpably universal or 'true.' The role of Ideas, their origins and even why 
they were asserted in the first place is central to this methodological 
analysis. 
Merton s~j·.s forth a paradigm for the sociology of knowledge by asking 
certain specific questions. First, he asks where the existential basis of 
mental productions is located~ He delineates two levels; social bases (social 
position, mode of production, power structure)t and cultural bases (values, 
ethos, cultural mentality). Mental productions to be analyzed are moral beliefs, 
ideologies, philosophy, religious beliefs, norms, technology, etc. He 
links mental productions to the existential bases in a functional or causal 
relation (determination, cause, necessary condition) or in a symbolic/ 
organismic relation (consistency, harmony, unity). These relations are 
perceived to be functional for the promotion of stability, maintenance of 
power, and for exploitation. Whereas Marx saw the mode of production as the 
primary determinant of the general character of the social, political, and 
intellectual processes of life,6 Karl Mannheim and Emile Durkheim depart from 
-6-
Marx by expanding determinants beyond class to group orgnnization, kinship 
and other bases for social organization. These other factors must be 
considered .. 
C. Wright Mills, in Power, Politics and People, explores the concept of 
truth and concludes that its validity is also socially-situated. That is, 
'truth' is contingent upon existing types of knowledge and although seemingly 
objective, ideas stem from observable social locations. Cultural concepts 
also shape ideas; moreover, !lnot only the content of va] ues in social inquiries 
should be detected, hut how values CrL'('-p in, and how, if at all, they condition 
the direction, completeness, and warrantabillty of the re.sults of research,,7. 
This is intrinsically linked with protest movements as one cannot fail 
to recognize the articulation of various group demands and the vocabularies 
used as being similarly socially-located. Mills uses the term 'motive' to 
describe "typical vocabularies having ascertainable functions in delimited 
societal situations"S. The agent articulating motives must use a language of 
sy'ffibols and ideas which will strike the listener's history and therefore 
motivate him/her to the desired action. These patterns of motives are 
intimately joined to society, to the existential social reality. Conflicting 
or competing motives may exist in secular urban societies. Mills offers as 
an example the transforma tion of the mar-ri.nge motive in contemporary society 
from economic considerations to tlec.ltilons b.J.seJ on luve. A concept that 
previously had a defined set of accompanying motives may now have conflicting 
or competing motives. As another eX<1mple, religion, in the early years of 
American Puritan history, was a motive for profit. The same motive is not as 
clearly connected to making profits anymore. 
What does all of this mean then, for women trying to influence a male 
power structure during the Progressive Era? Far from being fluid, American 
society had stabilized by the beginning of the twentieth century and had come 
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to terms with the con[ortable union betwl'l'1l government, business and the 
trade unions. Radical activities from this point onward would be confined 
to the margins of society. The difficulties which women were up against 
were enormous. Not only did the male power structure refuse to take women's 
suffrage seriously, they also ridiculed women's attempts to enter the poli-
tical sphere until their voice had become loud enough and the historical 
conditions had facilitated easier acceptance of the issue. 
As will be discussed later, hundreds of reform movements sprang up 
during the Progressive Era. Sume of lhe JUusl lieulc..:ule<l of Lhese groups 
were comprised of women working for suffrage, trade union reforms, child 
labor laws and consumer protection. The thousands of women who immersed 
themselves in philanthropic and political activities had great amounts of 
leisure time to devote and became very committed to their respective causes. 
What is most crucial to point out is that these activities were 'proper'; 
in no way did they deviate from society's designation of decorum for 
women. The support for reforms such as child labor laws and temperence 
and their volunteer work in settlement houses and hospitals were in every 
respect compatible with images of women as nurturant, moralistic and merc..i-
ful. Ironically, it was these qualHies which politically-minded women exploited 
to gain influence and acceptance., the result being the perpetuation of this 
codification of womanly temperament which necessarily bound women to inferior 
roles and reinforced their separateness and 'natural' alienation from the 
harsh realities of politics and urban problems. However, the positive effects 
of their participation were substantial [or women. for the first time, 
women were interested in and knowledgeable about public affairs and felt 
their vested interests extended beyond their homes into an even greater 
family called society.9 The mainstream suffrage association, the National 
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American Women's Suffrage Association, is most representative of this 
ideology. 
Most of the new avenues for women opened up late in the nineteenth 
century. Between 1870-1890, the number of colleges admitting women doubled 
and the number of women college students increased five-fold. By 1900, one 
half of the important American Women's organizations had been established. 
As William O'Neill notes, "One could argue ... that at the end of the nine-
teenth century, the emancipation of women was about as complete as it ever 
would be." lOAs the twentieth century opened, politics was the only area of 
any interest to women that was still denied to them. That is why the pursuit 
of suffrage became. the single most important goal to the majority of active 
women during this period. Their hope was to enter the corrupt male political 
sphere and, with their compassionate and moral sensibilities, sensitize and 
transform government into an administration with genuine and deep concern for 
its constituents. Consistent with Progressive inclinations, these women 
never questioned the legitimacy of the American political structure nor did 
they challenge the role of women in the family or the basic concept of male 
supremacy and domination. They failed to see that their oppression was linked 
* By 1980, women made up 1/6 of the work force whereas in 1950, they were 1/3 
of the work force. However, the percentage of women professionals has remained 
constant - 10% in 1980, 15% in 1930, and 12% in 1950. That is, in 1890, 36% 
of all professional workers were women; in 1950, 40% were women. The degree 
of sex segregation in employment categories in 1960 was about the same as 
in 1890. These facts are not meant to negate the many transformations that 
have taken place since 1900 but only to show that they do not actually 
compare in significance to the earlier ones. ll 
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to their subordinate roles in tile family and to the division of labur 
between the domestic and political sphere. Progressive feminists merely 
saw a few snarls to unwind and this could be one in a rational, scientific, 
and most of all, polite way. 
By looking at historical events and conditions during the time 
period under consideration, one can begin to comprehend the contextual 
elements which structured the ideas and actions of the NWP and the NWTUL. 
Chapter 2 
Background History of the Progressive Era 
The Progressive Era is a structural turning point in American history. 
There is much dispute over its roots and why it ended when it did. More 
basic is the question of whether Progressivism was modern enough for the 
century in which it was born. Regardless, it lS generally accepted that 
the elements which are so important in American society today: industrial-
ization, urbanization, and immigration, were created between 1880 and 1920. 
These three elements shaped American society and provided a pivotal starting 
poi.nt to American maturity and hegemony. 
Demographically, there are a few statistical facts to consider for 
this time period. From 1900 to 1910, the U.S. population increased 21%, 
from 75,994,575 to 91,972,266. The most striking trend was the dramatic 
migration of people from rural to urban areas. Urban populations grew by 
34% from 1900 - 1910. In 1910, 88.9% of the American population was white. 
There were half a million Orientals and Indians and 9,827,763 Blacks, 
89% of whom were in the South. Inunigrant population had increased to 14.7% 
of the total population in 1910 or 13,515,886. 
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Economically, one finds steady increases in wealth and income during 
the first decade. From 1899 - 1909, as population incre<1sed by 22%, 
the number of manufacturing establishments increased 29.4%; the capital 
invested increased 105.3%, the average number of wage earners, 40.4% and 
the value of products turned out, 76.6%. In 1909 the major industries 
were meat packing, iron and steel, lumbering, milling, clothing and textiles. 
However, by 1914, new industries linked with advancing technology were emerg-
ing, such as the automobile and petroleum industries. The expansion during 
the last half of the nineteenth century was prodigious; the numbers of 
la rge carpor a tions procluc ing m<lnu [ae tured good s were swell iog. 12 
As is widely known, the blessings of these factors were mixed. One 
sees an expanding economy with uneven distribution. The richest families 
constituting 1.6% of the population, received 10.8% of the national 
income in 1896 and 19% in 1910. The wealthiest 1% owned approximately 
47% of the national wealth. 13 In urban centers, people looked around and 
saw bigger buildings, more goods and competing prices; in essence, issues 
were defined quantiatively - 'how much' and Thaw many'. Businessmen led 
the nation in the quest for 'goodness in bigness~1 
The number of small businesses were decreasing during the mild depression 
between 1883-85. Business efforts had become too complex; men were extending 
the economy beyond their ability to understilnd i.t. On the one hand, there 
was a real effort to preserve cherished American values - community t good 
will, and respect. On the other hand, the booming economy encouraged hardline 
competion which made men view each other with suspicion and mistrust. The 
effort to integrate the opposing tendencies led to a heightened and very 
specific American moralism based on a Protestant work code which permeated 
-11-
all endeavors. It ,,,as destined to enter the moral/ideological sphere to 
motivate individuals to the point necessary for modern industrial capitalism. 
Industrial workers were [celing the system close in on them. Immigrant 
families from Europe and those from rural areas experienced a great deal of 
status deprivation. Expectations of financial and personal security plumrnetted 
ns the preconceived vision transformed into l13rsh reality. Problems abounded 
in the city; poverty, sewage problems, crime ;::md. poor working conditions 
compounded to close off various avenues of mobility. Out of the transplanted 
native-born American's own oppression came a nativist contempt for the European 
immigrants who were seen as breeders of poverty and crime and usurpers of 
America's resourc~s. 14 
Between 1895-1905, America experienced the formation of a new and very 
important middle class. Professionals swarmed to the cities seeking greater 
opportunities. This produced;] situation in which people of different 
backgrounds were sharing fairly common experiences. These people encouraged 
each other's efforts at self-determination and built loose networks of mutual 
concerns. Furthermore, "these men and women communicated so well in part 
because they were the ones building n new structure of loyalties to replace 
the decaying sys tern of the nineteenth cen tury communities." 15 
These social workers, lawyers, doctors, and administrators were unique 
in their professionalism. Their need for grandeur and association with 
influential political parties was gone. Their occupational organiztions actually 
replaced party loyalties and became vehicles for social reform. Hence, while 
partisanship declined, political involvement did not. The emphasis on profes-
sionalization and beauracratization dominated this new grouprs ethic. It was 
essential for members of this class to have specific skills and expertise. 
Moreover, their endeavors were pursued as scientifically as possible. Noting 
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the new-found respect nnd personnl hl'nC'fi ts the I se] f-consc:ious pioneers' 
recieved, they had turned their concerns outward and thrust their activities 
toward the urban plight. The emergence of this middle class is integral 
to an understanding of the membership make-up of the NWP and the NWTUL. 
The underlining emphasis for these people were equal opportunity for 
all men, obtaining values credit for hard work (money), and efficiency. 16 
The beauracracies they instituted ceased to be distinct from the individuals 
who comprised them. New social sciences were emerging which were analyzing 
people as social beings in relation to their environment. Society was 
considered to be a perfect meshing of all of its parts combined; the kinks 
in the system were to be uncovered, analyzed and removed. 
The pragmatism inherent in these ethics glorified the power of knowledge. 
The need for continuity .:llld. regul;l.rity underscored their pursuits; there 
was endless talk of order and efficiency with analogies made between society 
and a well-oiled machine. "With uncritical faith in education and science, 
the new members of the middle class became 'experts', immersing themselves 
in the scientific emthod, eradicating petty passions and narrow ambitions. 1l17 
As these people reached out to reorganize government, they also entered 
governmental positions as specialists and were relied upon for policy analysis 
and guidance. 
Thematically, interest in child lubor was central to the Progressive 
Era. This was more than mere sympathy and concern for the exploited young 
person; rather, "the child was the carrier of tomorrow's hope whose innocence 
and freedom made him singularly receptive to education in rational humane 
behavior."lBconcerns for women workers also held speical importance during 
this time period. A minimum wage and maximum "lOrking hours were fought for 
to preserve women's senstitivity and fragility despite their participation 
in an ever-increasingly hostile and oppressive workplace. 
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Another important aspect of the Progressive Era was the shift in 
emphasis from local political machinery to the national scene. As local 
problems were increasingly becoming national problems, people turned to 
Washington for national solutions. After 1900, lobbying in Washington 
began to reflect this modification. In the past, lobbying intents had been 
clear and the process fairly simple. As interests widened and the whole 
machinery became more complicated, many competing organizations with diverse 
programs emerged. Party .loya 1 ties could no longer be depended upon. 
Congressmen were forced to expand their programs and address the divergent 
needs of various groups. This increasing centralization required interest 
groups to base themselves in Washington in order to get immediate feedback 
and possible results. 19 By 1907, local reformers had begun migrating to 
Washington. A fervor for refonn was created, "stemming mostly -from optimism 
surrounding it (the system) and faith in its method". 20 
Along with this centralized atmosphere, the Executive Branch was gaining 
extreme importance and power in the political scene. ThePresident's duty 
was to evaluate the demands, place them in order of preference and national 
priority, and then pass or reject them swiftly. 
The Republican party suffered fatal internal tensions from 1910-12 
and by the time Theodore Roosevelt attelllpted to break ground with a new 
Progressive Party, the Democrats had found a reform leader of their own, 
Woodrow Wilson. Roosevelt's advanced program of federal economic and social 
regulations exposed the latent Progressives dilemma: "Could national regen-
eration be achieved, as most Democratic pro[essives thought, merely by 
destroying special privilege and applying the rule of equity to all classes? 
Or could the promise of American life be fulfilled only through a positive 
program of federal intervent-ion and participation in economic and social 
affairs as Roosevelt advocated?"21 
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In opposition to Roosevelt's defense of comprehensive public controls 
and the expansion of state and federal assistance, Wilson, a recent convert 
to progressivism, still r_etained nineteenth century laissez-faire precepts 
preserving the concept of federal authority interference only to IIdestroy 
artificial barriers to the full development of individual energies. ,,22 
His program was to destroy monoplics and unleash the potential energies of 
businessmen by restoring. the l:ullultlons unuer whic.h competition could 
flourish. Specifically, his program called for outlawing unfair trade 
practices and to then rely upon the courts to enforce an amended and strength-
ened Sherman (anti-Trust) Law. 23 He called this program the 'New Freedom': 
"the destruction of special privileges, the restoration of the reign of 
competition, and reliance for future progress on individual enterprise." 24 
America's participation in World War I was obviously another essential 
event of the Progressive Era. America's entry into the war occurred amidst 
an ignorant population. Wilsoll, failing to educate the people as to their 
vital stake in the outcome, instead pushed an ethic of democracy and al-
truism which "depicted interventi.on in terms of the strong and pure democ-
racy putting on the breastplate of righteousness to do battle for the Lord.,,25 
America was in no way prepared for the military and industrial effort, so 
Wilson launched a full-scale effort to 'educate' the American public. 
Since there was no attack on J\J1ler iean terr itory, public 'opinion was not 
solidified. Furthermore, millions of Americans, including Socialists, pro-
gressives and many many German and Irish-Americans, were in unified opposition 
to America's intervention. To deal with this, Wilson created the Committee 
on Public Information headed by George Creel, a progressive journalist from 
Denver. Creel was instrumental in establishing a system of voluntary press 
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censorship which was extremely successful. His next attempt was to make 
Americans war-conscious, and before the end of the war had engaged 150,000 
writers, lecturers, actors, and scholars in what may have been the most 
enonnous propaganda campaign in U. s. his tor~ Jc 
The official line to the American people was two-fold. First, that 
America's participation was a crusade to advance the cause of freedom 
and democracy throughout the world. On another .lcvet, the 'German Menace' 
theme was propigated and many of the official Allied atrocity stories were 
spread. Hence, much of the war hysteria was turned against German-Americans. 
For instance, many states forbnde church services in German and the teaching 
of the German language in schools. Cincinatti even went so far as to 
rule pretzels off of free lunch counters in saloons. 
The state of Civil Liberties during the war is reflected in the 
Espionage Act which Wilson enacted on June 15, 1917 which imprisoned 
people up to twenty years and/or a $10,000 fine for any number of what 
were considered traitorous acts. He also empowered the Postmaster General 
to halt mail which, in his opinion, advocated treason, insurrection, or 
forcible resist3nce to the laws of the United States. Postmaster General 
Albert S. Burleson, banned the American Socialist and two other Socialist 
magazines. Moreover, he censored all anti-British and pro-Irish publications. 
The anti-war fever led to massive witch-hunts which the Administration, though 
perhaps not directly responsible [or Lliem, made no effort to suppress. 
1,532 persons were arrested under the Espionage and Sedition Act: 65 for 
threats against the President and only ten for actual sabotage. These 
numbers do not cover the suppression which most assuredly transpi~ed on the 
local level. 2'.1 
\/ 
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Overall then, reform activities "ere "idespread and acceptable. The 
country, no longer in a state of transition, accepted the need for renova-
tions which did not threaten fundamental economic relations and social 
relations. With all of the various organizations in existence, many 
different group histories evolved which secured reforms and runctioned as 
historical precedents for l~ltl'r movem(>nts. Tile Lwo cha1Jcnge groups under 
consideration are the National Women's Party and the National Women's 
Trade Union League. The unfolding of organization events will provide a 
starting point for analysis. 
ChapLer 3 
Evolution of the National Woman's Party 
The story of the National Woman's Party is fascinating insofar as it 
deviates from so much of the reform activity representative of the Progressive 
Era. Their roots were grounued ill d Jl[[crenl setting and their strategy 
was entirely different [rom suffrage and other reform ac.tivities underway 
at the time.. Reactions to the party's activities is indicative of the 
threat which women's liberation posed to the American public and to the 
Administration al the time. 
The National Woman' s Party (NWP) initially sprang from the Congressional 
Union~a Congressional lobbying committee, which was part of the mainstream 
suffrage movement 7 The Nn tional J\mer Lean Woman's Suffrage Association (NAWSA). 1~ 
Since the formation of NAWSA, ~.JOl1lell' s Surf rage had been a very tame, moderate 
issue. Their major thrust was working for state-by-state referendums to 
give women the vote. The issue had been faithfully introduced at each session 
of Congress, but suffrage had not been debated in either house since 1887. 
* In the body of this paper, the CU-NWP will be referred to as the NWP 
for confenience; it "as not until 1917 that they officially merged into the NWP. 
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Many of the younger women in NAWSA were becoming increasingly 
impatient with NAWSA's reformist and non-confrontational tactics. The 
Congressional Committee (which, after the split, became the CD, later 
re-named the NWP) applied for auxiliary membership to NAWSA. Auxiliary 
status could permit the CU a certain degree of autonomy which they did 
not have as a sub-committee of the lnrgcr group. Since they had the 
necessary 300 memhers, and hCC;lI1SP of ;) ft':lr or further lilternal facti.on-
alism, their membership was accepted. 
The conflict between the CU and NAWSA stemmed from many things. As 
mentioned above, NAWSA's aim was to work state-by-state to pass suffrage. 
Furthermore, they felt that with suffrage, social inustices in America 
would be eliminated, not only for women but for everyone else as well. 
Their ideal of womanhood was one of nurturance, compassion and intuition. 
With the infiltration of \vomen into the public sphere would come a new 
and much-needed sensitivity. The CU vehemently objected to this and saw 
suffrage as one step to a revolution of attitudes about women. Although 
incomplete, their analysis led them to believe that with the attainment 
of suffrage, home and family life would be effectively changed. 
The organizat.ion was leu by Alice Paul, a young Quaker who had just 
returned from Britain where she was working with the WSPU (Women's Social 
and Political Union), avery radical and vocal feminist group. Paul was 
absolutely central to the growth o[ the movement (this will be brought up 
in subsequent discussion). At the 1913 NAWSA Convention which lasted for 
six days, Paul and her cohorts were severely attacked for their antics, 
their use of NAHSA funds for their own group's ends, and the very nature of 
their strategy. NAWSA felt that if the CU was to become autonomous they 
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should not use NAWSA headquarters, equipment, financial resources and 
membership lists. 
At this point it became clear that the ambiguous tie between the CD 
and NAWSA had to be clarified and resolved. Although a final break-up 
was imminent, there was still a certain reluctance on the part of Dr~ Anna 
Howard Shaw, president of NAWSA, to actually let them go. Personally, she 
liked their youth and enthusiasm. 
Besides the CU's thrust towards a federal suffrage amendment there 
were other differences in the two group's strategies to the final goal of 
suffrage. One of the most fundament"l and innovative ideals of the CU was 
to target the Democratic Party as being totally responsible for the 
painfully slow path to suffrage. Paul realized that to get the 2/3 
majority in both houses which was necessary for ratification, suffrage 
would h~lve to bl'come <l p~lrty jsslle. 
NAWSA adamantly held onto their non-partisan ideals and were offended 
by this, fearing that alienating either party, especially the Democratic 
Party, was a drastic mistake. Also, NAWSA felt that the CU was extending 
British politics into the American realm by placing faith in the Ldea that 
either party would ever completely control Congress enough to push for its 
passage. These elements along with the differences in generations and Dr. Shaw's 
lack of inspirationa.l and exciting leadership, precluded any reconciliation 
between the two organizations. 
The cuts first initiative as an autonomous group was to publicize the 
issue of suffrage. In March of 1913 the CU staged a huge parade. The timing 
was perfect; it was the day before Woodrow Wilson's inauguration as President. 
People in Washington, visiting the city for the ceremony, assumed the parade 
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was related to the inauguration and huge crowds amassed. Learning what 
the parade was for~ people became incensed and turned the orderly parade 
into a riot. Finally, troops were called in to restore order. They 
attempted to force the House of Representative Lo establish a women's 
suffrage committee, however, their efforts were to no avail. For this 
the CD consistently blamed the Democrats, since it was they who maintained 
that suffrage was a state, and not a federal issue. The CU next turned 
to the Senate where the suffrage amendment was pending; the vote would 
occur on May 9. The CU tried desperately to avert the vote until after 
Mayas they were planning large-scale demonstrations and wanted members of 
Congress to more carefully consider the results before they voted. They 
began to cultivate another lobby in Washington, even better than NAWSA's. 
They used press bulletins, petitions and deputations to the president, 
which were the usual means of forming a lobby, but with more energy and force. 
NAWSA, on the other hand, wanled to get the vote over with as quickly 
as possible so they could introduce the "Shafroth Amendment" (coined the 
Substitute Amendment by the CU) which called for a referendum for suffrage 
in each state. The CU's appeals for delilY turned out to be fruitless and 
the vote was taken and defeated, upholding the principle of states' rights. 
Immediately afterwClrds though, the Cll reintroduced the suffrage amendments 
to Congress, setli,ng <l new Congres~~ion;IJ pn._'l'edcnt in America. 
The national demonstrations they planned took place on May 2 in cities 
throughout the country. Resolutions were passed and at the huge demonstration 
on May 9 in Washington, delegates from all states presented their resolutions 
to Congress. As a result of continuing antagonism towards NAWSA, the Cll 
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did not even invite the national organization to the demonstration. It is 
hard to evaluate the success of the demonstrations. There was virtually 
no press interest, since the Mexican War was upstaging them. The demon-
strations did stand out though, as colorful and dramatic displays of beautiful 
banners and long lines of women. However, it became immediately clear 
that a more radical strategy was needed, so they decided to target the 1914 
Congressional election. 
Their plan was to defeat the Democrats in the nine suffrage states. 
Two CD women were to go to each suffrage state; one would work out of a 
headquarters and the other would travel to different cities and rural areas 
distributing literature and making speeches. They also very deliberately 
linked this action with a threat to interfere with the upcoming 1916 Presi-
dential election. Their goal was to mobilize as many of the four million 
voting women as they could and push all party and other affiliations aside 
and place women's interests above all else. 
The work was exhausting and although their successes were minimal, 
the issue was indeed highlighted in the elections. The CU claimed that 
they were partly responsible for the defeat of 25 Democrats and that Con-
gressmen had begun to visit their HQ seeking information on the Amendment. 
Certainly, not everyone agreed. In fact pro-suffrage and anti-suffrage 
individuals alike felt the CU had hurt the issue. Senator Charles S. 
Thomas of Colorado remarked - "I do not think that either women or men 
ordinarily voting the Democratic Party ticket changed their vote in response 
to the CU's appeal. On the contrary, the partisanship of the Democratic 
voters was aroused ... by the injustices of a propaganda which would sacrifice 
an old and tired friend of woman's suffrage to the personal animosities 
and disappointments of a few unreasoning people." 28 
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After this event, the CD realized that a more substantial and be aura-
cratic organization was needed to rely upon and to mobilize at a moment's 
notice. This effort to create state branches persisted from 1915-1917. 
They decided to organize a national voting organization whereby each 
state would elect n state chairwoman :lnd she would select a congressional 
district chairwoman.. Alice Paul wa.s twlely responsible [or this proposal 
and in the case of everything else she presented, it was automatically 
endorsed. 
The problems encountered though, were endless; no one welcomed them a 
States with existing organizations were afraid that the CD wonld factional-
ize the groups and create tensions. States like New York especially opposed 
their interference because their state campaign was approaching and they 
were afraid that the CD would alienate hoth men and women alike. Western 
suffrage states felt that wherever the CD was, there was trouble. They 
were also accused of accepting money from the Republican Party to squash 
the Democrats, although the CD denied this. 
These problems, however, seemed tiny compared wi th the problems 
encountered with the women in the south, problems which would persist in 
all of their endeavors. Southern women were especially adverse to holding 
Democrats responsible. Their party affiliations were very binding and had 
endured several generations. Racism in the south prevented white women 
from affiliating themselves with Black women at all; the CD ignored 
this issue whenever possible and when prodded, they reassured southern 
white women that they had nothing to fear since they outnumbered black women 
in the southern states. 
By 1916, however, they had alliances in 36 states which the CD divided 
into four districts for better structural organization. Before the end of 
1917, all 48 states had branches, yet it was a continuous struggle to prevent 
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them from dissipating. They exerted more effort once again in the south 
because southerners controlled two very important committees in the House 
of Representatives~ the Rules and the Judiciary committees. Both committees 
had to favor the federal suffrage amendment before it could reach the 
House floor. 
In June of 1916, western CU members met in Chicago and resolved to 
establish a Woman's Party. They were determined to secure the passage of 
the suffrage amendment by creating a western bloc of voting women. This 
new party, called the National Women's Party (NWP) would not sponsor a 
candidate and its only plank would be the enfranchisement of women. All 
western women were welcome for membership but the nucleus would be drawn from 
members of the CU's western branches; hence, Alice Paul in Washington 
retained ultimate control over all decisions. 
As might be expected, this plan drew sharp responses from both 
sides of the suffrage issue. Western non-member women were afraid of the 
confusion it might lead to and that efforts would be unnecessarily duplicated. 
They were also repulsed by a party based on sex lines. The anti-suffrage 
people were somewhat pleased with the plan. They thought it was so 
ludicrous that it would successfully alienate any potential supporters. 
Members of the NWP and CU met in August and agreed that if the Dem-
ocratic Party did not endorse the federal suffrage ,unendment before the 
1916 Presidential election, they would canvass the West and urge all women 
to withdraw support from Wilson and members of his party. Slogans to be 
used were, ltHe kept us out of suffrage ll and "A vote for the Democratic 
Party is a vote against women,'29 . Anncd with instructions, eighteen 
organizers went out west at the end of August. 
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This proved to be.1. tremclldotls1.y difficult task. For one thing, 
Republican party support was becoming a hindrance; financial contributions 
to the NWP and the presence of NWP speakers at Republican rallies alienated 
women who were suffragists and Democrats. The NWP was becoming an un-
important tangent to the Republican party and losing sight of their 
original goal. In Washington, Alice Paul was also becoming distressed 
about the gross miscalculation she had made by sending only eighteen 
women to 'cover' the West. Conditions were so bad and the women so 
exhausted that one. organizer, Inez Milholland Boissevan collapsed on stage 
during a speech in California and died. 
Their second tragedy surfaced with the election returns on November 7, 
1916. The concensus was that for all of the personal hardships the 
organizers had suffered., they had exerted no real influence on the out-
come of the election. Ten of the eleven suffrage states who had previously 
voted Republican gave their votes to Wilson and the Democratic party. 
The campaign was a failure and members collectively became depressed and 
discouraged until Allce Paul became so afraid of the group's termination 
that she issued a statement professing the absolute reverse of the situation. 
She said that it had not been a fail ure at all and that suffrage would 
pass before 1920 because the Democrats had been so overwhelmed by the NWP's 
threat. She also claimed a victory for the amount of educating it had 
accomplished and the publicity which they had achieved for suffrage. 
Members were revitalized and more optimistic once again~ 
This optimism was augmented by their next scheme. On January 10, 1917 
twelve CU members left their Washington headquarters and marched to the 
White House, stationing themselves in front of the gates. They picketed 
every day, in silence, for six months. Paul had been considering this 
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action for several months but had heen reluctant to actually carry 
it through out of fenr of the action's radicalism.. However, after 
persistently appealing to Wilson through deputations and receiving 
no encouraging feedback, she decided to execute it. This was the 
first spark of their more radical activities. 
After five months of indifference, people began to attack the 
picketecrs and periodically ucslroycd their equipment. War fever 
was spreading and the slogans on their placards particularly provoked 
increasingly patriotic citizens. "Kaiser Wilson, have you forgotten 
your sympathy for the poor Germans because they were not self-governed? 
Twenty thousand American women are not self-governed. Take the Beam 
out of your own eye." 30 was just one of the slogans which turned 
spectators into an angry and disorderly mob. NWP headquarters were 
also invaded and the building was defaced. One military man almost 
killed three picketing women when he fired at them through an open 
window .. 
Alice Paul privately welcomed the publicity but publicly protested 
police negligence. This continued over a period of time until city officials 
were pushed to the point of arresting the picketeers to 'restore order'; 
the grounds of arrest were obstructing traffic. Wilson thought that imprison-
ment would scare the women into ceasing but the day after a short stay in 
prison, the picketing resumed. Arrests continued until the end of November. 
The story of these women in prison (some 168 in all) is perhaps at 
the core of what the NWP stood for and hoped to accomplish. After a number 
of arrests, Wilson wanted to, once and for all, stop the 'nonsense' and 
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decided to sentence Alice Paul to prison for seven months for obstructing 
traffic. This merely served to spark the biggest picket line on November 10 
and forty-one of these women were also sentenced to prison. These women 
were taken to the Ocoquan workhouse, physcially beaten, and dragged to 
their cells. 
To protest this, Paul, who was separated from her cohorts in another 
ward, instigated a hunger strike which spread to the other women. After 
a week, officials became so afraid that they tried force-feeding which the 
women resisted for as long as was physically possible. Alice Paul further-
more, was subjected to psychological testing after being placed in the 
psychopathic ward and pronounced "paranoic. 1l 
Conditions in the Virginia jail were abominable; rats were rampant, 
the food was filled with worms and the women were prevented from seeing 
anyone, including lawyers and relatives. NWP members outside the prison 
decided to obtain a writ of habeus corpus and have them moved to the 
Washington district jail. Fearful of moving the women in their weakened 
states, they begged the NWP to put off the appeal; they of course refused. 
Finally, on March 4, 1918, the Court of Appeals declared that every 
one of the 218 suffragists who had been arrested had been so illegally. 
Discussion of the cruelties inflicted upon them emerged and the emaciated 
and traumatized women were present to dramatize this. 
In concurrence with these events, political developments began to 
emerge. A Women's Suffrage Committee was finally created by Congress on 
September 15, 1917 after four yenrs of struggle. Yet the picketing continued; 
they were determined not to stop untIl the amendment was passed. At this 
point also, the NWP and the CU officially merged under the NWP. 
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Now that the u.s. was engaged in \.JWI, many women wanted to work on 
war activities. Paul insistently fought this, saying it was inconsistent 
to fight for democracy in Europe -while it was begin denied in America. 
She wanted to deny members the freedom to engage in any other activities 
until suffrage was achieved but she realized they would not accept this 
dictum easily. Therefore, she allowed people to decide this issue for 
themselves but they never questioned her authority and devoted themselves 
to their suffrage work. 
President Wilson, on January 9, reported that he had changed his 
position and that he was now in support of the Federal Amendment. His previous 
positio~ he admitted, had been inconsistent with his stand on democracy; 
suffrage was now legitimized as a war issue. NWP of course, took the 
credit for his change of attitude, although this was not actually the 
case. On January 10, the Amendment passed the House 274-136. It was then 
taken to the Senate which, to everyone's surprise, ignored it and kept 
postponing the vote. 
The NWP was incensed. Bobmarding their offices with petitions, 
letters, nnd visits, thL'Y :Ilsn held (1)('1) ;lir meeLLng publicL~ing Wilson's 
failure to pass Ule AmendmenL. The delIlons tralors were again ar res ted, 
this time for not having a street permit. This continued until mid-
September when suddenly they were given a permit for which they had not 
even applied. 
The debate was renewed in Congress on September 26, 1918. After 
three days of discussion, prospects seemed dim, and without precedent, 
Wilson agreed to speak to the Senate and urge passage of the Amendment. 
The vote was taken on October 1 and was once again defeated. In despera-
tion, the NWP commenced their 'watchfire action' in front of the ~~ite 
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House. Arrests were made [or llgllting these bonfires after sundown 
and hunger strikes were initiated in the jails once again. On February 
9, thirty-six suffragists left the NWP headquarters and burned an 
effigy of Wilson in front of the White Ilouse. For this, they wcre 
severely rebuked, especially byNAWSA. 
By this point, everyone realized the inevitability of the passage 
of the Amendment and Wilson called an extra session of Congress on 
May 19, 1919. Finally, the amenumcnt passed 56-25. After f if teen 
months of working for state ratification, women at last had the vote. 
Beginning from the first suffrage struggle, it took thousands of 
dedicated women forty-four years to get the vote. 
Immediately after their triumph, the NWP began deciding their 
next course of action. Suggestions of prison reforms and disarmament 
were popular but Alice Paul decreed that they would sponsor the Equal 
Rtp;hts Amendment. Once .1gn-ill she convinced her followers .lnd they 




Evolution of the Natioll<11 Homen's Trade Union League 
The story of the NWTUL is very different from the NWP. Once it 
became evident that '-..Jomen in the labor [or~c were b(~ing exploited and 
were not being organized by the men's industrial unions, a group of 
working women, social reformers and settlement workers decided, during 
an AFL Convention, to form an independent organization. They were the 
first organization to deal with specific problems facing women in 
industry. They were responding to the prevailing conviction that union-
ization was the key to improvement for all workers. Before their formation, 
there had been some strikes by women workers which had been aided by ad-hoc 
unions. There had also been women's auxiliaries created by wives of men 
in particular unions, raising funds for emergency situations such as sick-
ness or unemployment. 
The NWTUL w;)s similar to the British trade Union Lenguc. They organized 
as a federation of women's unions as well as allowing individual member-
ship. Their main purpose was "the organization of women into trade unions 
to be affiliated with the regular labor movement, in this case with the 
Al' of L, Gnd the strengthening o[ all such organizGtions as already existed."31 
The first branches were formed in Chicago, New York and Boston in 1904. 
Their first three years focused on preparatory work, introducing 
themselves to unions and workers. They offered their headquarters as 
meeting places for new and poor unions and provided speakers for interested 
unions. The League was opened to everyone, not only working women. The 
only requirements for membership were: a belief in the organization of 
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<111 workers into trnde unions, equal P,;lY for equill work, the eight-hour 
day, a living wage and full citizenship for women. 32 
Initially, the leadership was dominated mostly by middle and upper 
classwornen. In 1907 Mrs. Raymond Robbins of Chicago became the national 
president and held the position until 1922. She was extremely wealthy and 
donated all of her free time and much money to the League. Robbins' 
middle-class attitudes accordingly shaped the first years of the organi-
zation. By 1910, however, working class women were playing more important 
roles in the organization, yet still counted on the special contributions 
of these other women. 
Their first 'convention' was in 1907 at Norfolk, with only seven 
delegates present. It was very informal and most of the women were also 
delegates to the AFL. The League had been endorsed by the AFL but it 
was not an official brancll. The relationship between the League and the 
AFL is complex and essential to an understanding of the intrinsic progressivism 
of the NWTUL; this will be discussed later.) Every year after this, the 
League held a convention as its membership swelled and the range of its 
activities broadened. 
Their first action came in 1909 in Chicago, when a handful of women 
workers walked out in protest against conditions in the men's clothing 
trade. News of the walk-out sprc<ld to other shops and by the next day 1,000 
people had left work. Within three weeks, 40,000 were on strike33 . The 
League helped form a strike committee, joined picket lines, and obtained 
legal aid for the demonstrators. 
The middle and upper -class women, known as allies, were able to arouse 
the support of wealthy people in the area and raised $29,000 for people in 
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jail, $20,000 for relief and they organized" parade of ]0,000 people to 
protest police brutality against the strikers. The NWTUL was the only 
organization to bring working and middle/upper class women together. 
Theoretically, it was an important idea but in practice, class issues 
emerged and thwarted many of their efforts. 
Similar work was done by the local WTUL in Chicago in 1910 with 
workers in the clothing industry. The WTUL raised $70,000 in relief funds, 
established a picket committee <lnd patr.olled the strects ensuring the 
striker's safety against police and spectator brutality. The WTUL played 
important roles at the Carpet Weavers' Strike in Roxbury, Mass., the 
Corset Makers Strike in New York, and after the Triangle Shirtwaist Co. 
fire in New York which killed 147 people, they obtained relief for victims 
and their families. 
Subsequently, they led investigations of fire hazards and other 
unsafe working conditions in the shops. Wherever a strike occurred, the 
League was present in all imaginable and useful ways; their work was 
indispensable. They also published a monthly magazine called Life and Labor, 
which informed working women of what was happening in strikes around the 
d 1 1 . l' 34 country an in t e _egls _atlve arena. 
Amidst their investigations and their attempts to cultivate a 
sympathetic public, the Lawrence Textile Strike of 1912 prompted them to 
take more direct action in defense of the workers. In January of 1912, 
a law was passed in Massachusetts which reduced the working week from 
56 to 54 hours. The protest was against the reduction in their weekly 
wages which accompanied the decrease in hours and the increasing amount 
of production expected of them. By January 15, most. of the city's 35,000 
workers were on strike. 
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Joseph J. Etter, an organizer for the Wobblies (IWW), helped to 
organize the workers into a cohesive group with his unlimited energy and 
skillful leadership. Soon after, John Colden, President of the United 
Textile Workers (AFL) came and advised the WTUL to stay out of Lawrence 
temporarily because of the IWW's 'infiltration'. The League became 
increasingly restless with their inactivity "yet they believed that their 
affiliation with the AFL forbade their supporting a group whose methods 
fundamentally differed" 35. However, af ter much discussion amongst them-
selves and consultation with the AFL, the League entered and established 
relief Headquarters. 
The strike was highly successful and by the beginning of March, the 
owners made their first concessions, which the UTW accepted. Officially, 
the strike was over and relief was given only to those who would return 
to work .. The l.eague was forcpd to withdraw its support. 
The IWW however, and 5,000 other workers, would not accept the settle-
ment and although the League sympathized with the workers still on strike, 
they were not allowed, by AFL orders, to offer aid to anyone. 
The conflict which ensued forced women to sharpen their loyalties; 
either they were with the AFL or against them. They tried talking to 
Samuel Compers and John Colden but this proved futile. Considering the 
AFL's power and influence, they decided to maintain relations with them 
rather than risk their chances for survival by alienating this influential 
organization. Privately though, many women were deeply impressed with the 
spectacular and creative methods which the IWW had employeed. Detecting the 
women's dissatisfaction, the AFL appeased the women by granting the League 
$150.00 a month for one year. 
The year 1913 marked the beginning of the League's new direction, the 
beginning of their second phase. Their emphasis at this point turned to 
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education. Mrs. Robbins decided that the working class women themselves 
must be 'trained' to be union leaders. It had become evident that the 
more articulate, better educated upper class women were dominating the 
organization and that this leadership could not justifiably come from this 
source anymore. At their convention, they decided to establish training 
schools for active women workers in the labor movement and resolved to 
secure money for scholarship. This proved to be a momentous decision 
in terms of their future work. 
The local leagues had had Engl ish classes for foreign women for several 
years but in 1914, their new training school started with three women. Each 
school term consisted of academic work in economics, history of industrial-
ization and unionization, methods of trade agreement and bookkeeping. Four 
months of academic work and eight months of field training were expected 
of them. They were registered as 'ul1cla8tdfied students' first at North-
western University, then at the School of Civics and Philanthropy and 
finally at the University of Chicago. 
They encountered numerous obstacles finding it difficult to get women 
interested in the school, as well as finding them jobs in the labor movement 
upon graduation. Even so, by 1929, of the forty-four women who received 
scholarships to be trained, thirty-two of them had participated in high 
levels of the labor movement. In a hasty move, the League ended the school 
in 1926, assuming their initiative would be picked up by other groups. 
In 1915, the AFL stopped their monthly payments to the League. Instead 
of giving them money, Samuel Gompers wanted to hire a woman organizer, 
chosen by himself and Hrs. Robbins, to atteno to women's needs in the labor 
movement. The male unions had been expressing disapproval of the AFL's 
donations to the League and Gompers did not want to risk his ties with them. 
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With regards to World War I, the League had maintained, before 
United States involvement, their belief in peace and American neutrality_ 
However, as America's participation in the war became imminent, the 
League shifted along with prevailing national opinion. At the 1917 League 
Convention, Mrs. Robbins urged members to give undivided loyalty to 
America in support of its war for democracy. Numerous League members 
were called to Washington and were appointed to various posts: Mary 
Anderson as Director of the Women's Bureau, Mrs. Robbins as a member 
of the Women's Conunittee of the Council of National Defense and many more. 
, 
Along with a diminished supply of financial resources, this served to 
diffuse the group's goals and greatly hindered the groups activities. 
On the other hand, the war-time era was also hailed as a new period 
for women in terms of job oppo~tunities. However, although greater numbers 
of women were entering the labor force, the AFL was not responding to these 
shifts by putting out an effort to organize women, skilled and unskilled. 
They were extremely worried that war-time opportunities for women would 
infringe upon male workers' privileges. In turn, they rejected a re::;olu-
tion from the NWTUL asking that two members of the Executive Board of the 
AFL be women. The major wartime gain for women came from the federal 
government. In June, 1918, a Women in Industry division of the Department 
of Labor was created. The NWTUL had been agitating for this since 1909. 
The League had also concientiously supported suffrage for women since 
the group's inception. They worked fairly closely with other women's 
organizations, such as the National Amcr ican lvomcn f s Suffrage Association 
and other groups of social feminists. At times, these links alienated 
the League from men and women in the Labor Movement as a whole because 
of the middle class nature of the feminist movement. 
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The vote was so important to the League that I!through their 
participation in the League and in the NAWSA, women trade unionists had 
equated the ballot with equal pay, prohibition, and child labor, the end 
of sweated pay, and in short, indu,strial freedom"36. In fact, the 
League was so successful in associating suffrage with the rights of 
\vorking women that Senate opposition to the nineteenth amendment was 
interpreted as hostility to labor reform. 
At this point, by breaking up the evolutions of the organizatons into 
specific movement variables, insight can be gained into the structure 
and methods which the NWP and the NWTUL used to influence authority for 
social change. 
Chapter 5 
Analysis of Movement Variables 
Organizational Structure 
Organizational structure is most crucial to a consideration of 
day-to-day progression of a challenge group as well as the methods 
used to accomplish g0.:11s~ Host important, a challenge group must have 
a constituency which can be easily mobilized. There is no definitive 
answer to this but facing an organized antagonist who has control over 
vast resources, the challenge group will often take on the organizational 
structure of the antagonist. William Gamson has put forth two necessary 
criterion for successful mobilization. First group members must be 
committed enough to the organization to be activated when necessary. 
In other words, there must be a continuity to their struggle so that 
constant everyday contact is not necessary for effective group action. 
Also, the organization must be able to handle internal conflict. 37 
Gamsoil goes on to suggest three elements of group organization: 
bureaucracy, centralization and factionalism, all of which arc key 
components in analyzing the degree of success. Bureaucracy simply 
means creating role structures to ensure that different people will 
assume the responsibility for certain jobs. A written document or 
charter, a formal member list and three or more levels or divisions are 
necessary prerequisites for a bureaucracy. However, while maintenance 
of bureaucratic structure might guarantee group readiness, Gamson found 
that it did not address problems of internal conflict. 
Centralization, on tI,e other hand, did just that. When a group is 
centralized, a definite commanding authority is explicit~ whatever the 
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character of that authority. Members of the group have a certain figure 
or group of leaders to whom they may look for guidance, support and 
orders~ These two elements~ bureaucracy and centralization, make inde-
pendent contributions to tl1C success of eha 11 enge groups, hut comhined, their 
effect is significantly greater with respect to acceptance by the public 
and gaining new advantages and resources 38 . 
Factionalism is the consequence of a group's inability to deal with 
internal tensions or divisions. It can be a formal separation or an 
underlying internal friction. As intimated above, centralization has a 
powerful connection to factionalism; factionalism is contained by a 
unity of command which exercises controls to manage internal conflict. 
These variables: bureaucracy, centralization and factionalism are not 
meant to be absolute; rather, they are to be used as 'ideal types' by 
which to base a comparison of existing challenge groups. 
ThC" N.1t'ionnl Hom:ln's Party lends ~-Hlpport t"O the nhovC' postulilics. 
Structurally, the NWP was totally centralized and virtually all power was 
held in the hands of one woman, Alice Paul. All decisions, sentiments and 
attitudes stemmed from or were channelled through Paul who rejected or 
accepted them~ Not wanting to appear overly <lutocr<1ti<.:, Paul estahlished 
a hierarchical bureaucracy consisting of a self-appointed chairwoman, 
(herself) and a vice-chairwoman chosen by herself. Lucy Burns, her vice-
chairwoman met Alice Paul in Britain and both worked with the WSPU. 
Therefore, their backgrounds and ideologies were almost identical. An 
executive board was selected by these two women and served merely to 
endorse all of Paul's proposals. This bureaucracy not only made the 
organization more efficient hut also ]ed mC'mbers to believe that the 
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organization was open and flexible enough to enter and climb upwards 
through. 
Shortly after the NWP's permanent split with the NAWSA, the strength 
of Paul's domination over the group was challenged for the first time. A 
small group of members became dissatisfied with her and formed a separate 
connnittee to discuss problems including desired changes in organizational 
structure~ their need f-or an active voice in policy decisions and their 
increasing suspicion of Paul's handling of organization finances. They 
presented these points to Paul and by that time, dissension had spread and 
women were openly discussing their grievances. 
Paul's reaction was characteristically consistent; she was annoyed 
by the petty disruption and refused to even listen to the complaints. 
With the vision of a small, tight group in mind, she was irritated that 
women wished for a more democratic group structure. Paul was afraid that 
if she granted voting rights to all members, nothing would be accomplished. 
She chose not only to ignore the complaints and requests, but also re-
taliated by telling members that they would never have a vote and that 
she would never be held accountable [or group finances. She demanded 
complete loyalty to the NWP and hence, the resignation of women who did 
not wish to comply. She said; "It is better to have a small united group 
than an immense debating socicty.1I39 
Realizing the pressures to make at least one concession, she established 
a national advisory counci'l which, as might be expected, was more ornamental 
than instrumental. Prominent and respectable women were placed on the 
council to upgrade the group' s image. ,[,Iley did nothing but rubber-stamp 
Paul's policies. Many women resigned as a result, which satisfied Paul; 
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she wanted nothing to uo with Lllose women wIto were not going to follow 
her blindly. One woman who resigned, Charlotte A. Whitney, was roused 
to asperity and issued the following statement: 
"I take this step because the CD is an autocratic 
organization with its control entirely in the hands 
of one woman. The Susan B. AnLllony Alllcnumenl (suf[-
rage) and the whole suffrage movement stands for 
democracy and should work for democracy. It should 
seek to 3\vaken and quicken women to a sense of 
responsihility and solidarity, hased upon individual 
and social justice, but the CU is submerging the 
individuality of the worker into a blind following 
under hypnotic leadership. The spirit underlying 
the work and methods is the 1 king can do no wrong' 
and the cause must be won regardless of method. ltD 
Although there was internal tension, members dld inJecd follow Paul without 
much dissent during her 'reign' as president. This centralization success-
ofully weeded out those who were dissenters from those who would not cause 
conflict. 
Paul, realizing the need to cover larger areas of the country, began 
to bureaucratize the NWP. Even before the creation of state branc.hes in 
1915, various responsibilities were delegated to individuals. This was 
essential to the maintenance of the organization because many diverse 
strategies were undertaken simultaneously; a division of labor placed 
women in fields of interest with accountability to the central authority. 
Morever, with a charter and a campaign text-book, they had a defined con-
stitutionalized purpose. 
In terms of membership size, Paul was not very open about informing 
the public or even other group members, of the actual total of paying members. 
In fact, these figures are difficult to determine and leave one in doubt 
as to whether strict records were ever kept. Paul claDllcd a total membership 
of 40,000. It is more likely that the group's membership never exceeded 
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25,000 with a total of 8,000 at most, consistently involved with the 
group's activities. It is peculiar that while Paul wanted to work only 
with a small group, she also wanted to convey an inflated group number 
to NWP constituents and to the public. This was probably a desire to 
impress people with NWP success and appeal. Financial records are also 
vague and incomplete. It is certain though, that money was scarce and 
because of a few immensely wealthy members, others in the organization 
were hesitant to contribute lesser amounts of money and so did not. 
From 1915-1917, the NWP created state branches to place their own 
political blocs in all states. Ultimate centralization had to be expanded 
and membership had to be re-organized to be accountable to state heads. 
This posed a problem for Paul who did not to lose control over the organi-
zation and let it wither away into a coalition of state networks. Therefore, 
she set up a national voting organization with a delegated voting convention. 
Each stLltc was to elect a slate ch'::llrwoman who woulJ In turn select a 
congressional district chairwoman.. Many group members saw this as one 
of Paul's great concessions when, in reality, she decided to do this 
because the large and diffuse member~hip had simply become too big to con-
trol. With the formation of the national voting organization, Paul's 
centralized control over the expanding NWP was ensured. The eventual 
merging of the NWP and the CU in 1917 served the same purpose; it was a 
way to re-organize the rank-and-file by consolidating group membership 
with centralized authority based in Washington. 
One of the most striking contrasts between the NIVP and the NIVTUL is 
the decentralized structure of the NIITUL. More important than the National 
League which merely consolidated local efforts and published a magazine, 
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were the state Leagues which, triggered by local strikes, reacted according 
to their individual resources and interests. A frequently made point was 
that "the presige and standing of the National Organization is largely 
dependent upon the vitality and accomplishments of the locals~Tl41 However, 
this decentralization did not prove to be successful because there were 
not enough local leagues to solidify the power base. By 1924, there were 
only 15 working branches, certainly not enough to provide support for 
other local branches under financial or other types of stress. 
In view of Gamson's conclusion that a centralized structure deals 
more successfully with internal tension than a decentralized organization, 
one must examine the extenuating circumstances surrounding the NWTUL to 
comprehend the uniqueness of their situation. As a result of their member-
ship make-up, very obvious class differences emerged which, at times, served 
to divide group members. Furthermore, the NWTUL did not have a single 
central leader to deter intra-group antagonisms. Another point of con-
tention which divided group members actually concerned group goals and 
purpose. Conflict over such issues as who should be allowed to join, 
where funds should be directed and whether protective legislation should 
be supported, continually plagued the group, preventing a unified outlook 
and direction. Fortunately, social relations tended to obliterate class 
divisions and mitigate class conflict but this was indeed a persistent 
tension within all branches of the Women's Trade Union Leagues. 
For purposes of self-perpetuation and even more so than the NWP, the 
NWTUL bureaucratized themselves and their local branches so that a very 
rigid differentiation of purpose and duty existed for members in Leagues. 
This over-bureaucratized structure often precluded a wholistic sense of 
integration and commitment to tliC organization as their duties were 
specialized and focused. Perhaps it was necessary though, for efficiency. 
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The NWTUL constitution outlined [our classes of members: local and 
state Leagues, members at large, and affiliated organizations. On the 
local level, there was to be a seven-member board consisting of trade 
unionists in good standing. The Executive Board of the National League 
involved three officers and three representatives, two of whom had to be 
traded unionists from the local branches. 42 
Membership in the tn·nUL was significantly different than in the NWP. 
While the head of the NWP wanted the organization to remain small, active 
and cohesive, the NWTUL formed a broad-based constituency, including not 
only working class, but middle and upper class women as well. The require-
ments for membership were a belief in and commitment to the following: 
the organization of all workers into trade unions, equal pay for equal 
work, the. eight-hour day, a living wage, and full citizenship for women.43 
Because the size of the various League branches fluctuated each year 
according to the specific city's commitment to labor agitation, financial 
resources from sympathetic spectators fluctuated also, thus making it 
difficult to accomplish long-range planning. Nevertheless, in a typically 
bureaucratic fashion, conventions were held annually to consolidate 
strengths and resources and also inform others of regional ac tivities .44 
Sometimes, a city formed a League branch spontaneously during or 
after a strike which may then have died for reasons specific to the par-
ticular situation. Furthermore" without the centralized 'unity of 
command' evident in the NWP, the motivation to form a League and sustain 
it was simply not present. Hence, many branches survived almost arbitrarily; 
perhaps a wealthy benefactress would join or male unions would be sympathetic 
in a certain city. For example, the Philadelphia LC.:lguc' 8 budget in 
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1924 \.,ras $5700.00, 25% L.oming from TraJc Union sources, 45% [rom upper 
class members and 30% from benefits. By contrast, the New York League's 
budget was $23,000, 80% of which came from donations. 45 
One can see then, that the NWP and the NWTUL, by virtue of goals, 
resources, and extenuating circumstances, structured their organizations 
extremely differently. On both sides, various advantages were sacrificed 
over others. For instance, by remaining decentralized, the NWTUL for-
feited a stronger and more unified political bloc. Yet, they realized 
that given the unique factors at work in the different cities, it might 
have been impossible for one central group to oversee activities and 
direct funds into priority areas. 
In contrast, the NWP was Alice Paul and vice versa; it is impossible 
to separate the two. Structurally, she saw to it that all controlling 
forces would remain in Washington headquarters and, more specifically, 
in her hnnds. A facade of import:lnt hierarchiC's appc:lscd and even fooled 
many women into believing that a Democratic process was at work. Those 
who were not deceived were encouraged to leave the organization; there 
was no attempt to modify the organizational structure to accommodate 
group members. 
Membership Make-up 
The next variable in question is membership make-up. To analyze 
the different types of actions of which people are capable or are motivated 
to undertake, one must examine the people who are involved in these groups, 
their motivations for joining and their backgrounds. With respect to 
both groups under consideration, the issue of class interest is dominant. 
One must not overlook the fact that the ruling or dominant class has 
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specific interests to promote or protect which stem not from any overt 
intent to oppress other classes, but rather from an historically-based 
consolidation of interest and resource into the hands of their own class. 
Therefore, it is crucial to look at class background to determine to what 
extent these women, operating in a p'eriod of extensive middle class 
social feminism, actually allowed their middle class interests to subvert 
any radical change in societal structure which women from a different class 
might have desir~d. Fortunately, the working class nature of the NWTUL 
which included middle and upper class women, facilitates easy comparison 
of class interests in one group. With this in mind, let us turn to the 
specific groups. 
As referred to in Chapter 1, the women who formed the CU were younger 
than those in the national organization, the NAWSA. These younger women 
were becoming impatient with the 810\\!, tactful state work which was 
producing no positive results; in fact, there were no results at all. 
Suffrage had been moot for quite a long time and these energetic and 
youthful women decided to try different approaches to re-establish the 
vitality of the suffrage issue. 
It was not only their age which distinguished these women from the 
others. Coming from the more radical Women's Social and Political Union 
(WSPU) in Britain, Alice Paul and Lucy Burns applied what they had learned 
to the American situation. .Using colors which were suspiciously similar 
to the British organization colors on their banners and similar types of 
tactics, the flavor of the group was distinctively different from that of 
the mainstream women's groups of the United States. 
The point here is that women who joined were well aware of the group's 
separateness and radicalism. Far from being working class, membership 
of the NWP was mostly college-educated, middle and upper class 
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professional, or recently-grauu<1teJ women. Clearly, this information 
sheds light on NWP strategy in light of their intent to extinguish gender 
differentiation rather than highlighting women's separate needs as 
the NWTUL did. The NWP, as middle class white women, worked for reforms 
like suffrage and ERA to get rid of governmental barriers to their 
individual freedom. They had faith that there were enough women like 
themselves who did not need protective legislation and who, exercising 
full rights, could allow their capabilities to shine through. 
For group prestige and better financial security, group members 
were alerted to recruit prominent women to join the NWP. Women such as 
Carrie Chapman Catt and Ida Harper, well-known women activists, would 
not join because of the auLocraLicism or the organization. The NWP did, 
however, get their share of social feminists like Mrs. O. H. P. Belmont, 
the wife of a financier, who was eccentric hut extremely dedicated. By 
1919, she had given $50,000 of her own money to the group. Furthermore, 
these very women were physically beaten, harrassed, and jailed when NWP 
activities became violent. What was it that incited these women to take 
such risks? 
Since the m,p was not interested in a broad-based constituency, the 
smaller and tighter group size allowed Alice Paul, who was in charge of 
recruiting, to select the appropriate women to join her organization. 
Generally, the type of woman sought was extremely articulate, with superior 
financial and executive abilities; being a good speaker and hard worker was 
not enough. Single women were preferred; the reason being that there was 
much travelling involved and they wanted their members to be mobile. 
However, it was much more than that; they wanted women who were disengaged 
from society to a certain extent. Women who were tied to husbands, 
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boyfriends or children were not regarded as having serious political 
potential. This was not on account of ideological principles but 
because these other group interests diffused their energy and psycho-
logical loyalties. Paul did not want the typical progressive social 
feminist working for her. She opposed women involving themselves in 
activities for the good of humankind or to merely fill up their other-
wise leisurely hours. 
Membership in the NWP can be viewed as an adaptation to a singular 
cultural identity. Siegel writes that in a group with tightly integrated 
and highly centralized values, there is a tendency to subordinate indivi-
duality to group interests. Group demands and decisions are not questioned 
by members who are kept in states of high anxiety, with all faith resting 
in their leader. Solidarity, communal behavior, and inter-dependency 
are emphasized here. These qualities are found in defensive groups with 
limited resources. 46 
The membership of the NWP fits into this paradigm in many ways. One 
should not underestimate though, women's tigllt integration into society-at-
large. One of the most difficult obstacles to organizing women is their 
familial involvement which -cuts across gender lines and prevents women 
from seeing themselves as a class. Racial minority groups and working class 
people do not have interests as diffused. Nevertheless, only those women 
who had the least amount invested in other groups and who could be 
"isolated from their former identity" were recruited by Alice Paul. Certainly, 
not all women gave up thcir past identities [or thc NWP but, to a large 
extent, Paul's group offered symbols, (suffrage, organization colors) a 
dogma and a charismatic leader to fulfil member's needs. By assigning 
important duties to each core member, it was possible to sever ties even 
further between members and family/friends. Paul's centralization of 
authority corresponds with Siegel's added point that "special knowledge 
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confirms power," that " ••. those in power act in sacred or semi-sacred 
capacity. ,,46 All of these elements point to a highly integrated group with 
a single and very intense doctrine which is bestowed upon members in 
the form of decrees from the organization's leader. The group in turn 
becomes the (or one of the) reference point(s) by which the member bases 
his/her evaluations of the world. 
The one factor which sets the NWTUL apart from every other women's 
organization is its membership make-up. The reasons for this are fairly 
clear. As discussed above, upper and middle class social feminists 
sought a new and untouched field of assistance. In the labor movement, 
not only did they find women in need of organization and representation, 
but they also saw an opportunity to grieve for the hard, unfeminine 
life of a working woman, 'learn' about it, and help them to overcome its 
horrible side effects by holding teas for them, teaching them singing 
and dancing; in general, imposing their middle class values onto working 
class women. One ally wrote, "It has been my dream to develop young women 
to be a help in the awakening of their class.,,47 
Allies actually romanticized poverty to the point of perceiving it 
as an exciting transcendence of mundane feminine roles. One ally wrote, 
"Thank God working girls have a chance to be themselves, because they earn 
their own wage and nobody'owns them.,,48 The condascension implicit in this 
was acute and while the majority of the working class women accepted the allie's 
benevolence, many became irritated, resentful or just suppressed discontent 
about the allies' inability to empathize with their actual situations. 
A few of the Socialist working women became incensed at these attitudes 
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and voiced their discontent. OnC' very (1ctiv(' union woman, Leonora O'Reilly 
made speeches to the National League about college-educated feminists 
with high ideals who knew absolutely nothing about a working woman's life 
and her needs. She carried out a campaign against an ally named Laura 
Elliot who was offering working class members courses in singing, art, 
elocution, and took women on field trips to art museums. 
Another example of the allie's ignorance was when they scheduled a 
League Conference on Yom Kippur despite Jewish member's protests. More-
over, in the League's classes on IlNew World Lessons for Old World People", 
there were reference::> to Jewish working women going to church. In 
text-books put out by the League, Jewish women were described as "dark-
eyed, studious, revolutionaryll and Italian women as "docile, fun-loving, 
submissive, and superstitious." 49 This reflection of their ignorance of 
and unfamiliarity with limnigrant working women essentially undermined 
the potential for effective group solidarity within the League. 
A persistent problem was ally domination on the governing boards of 
the leagues. In the first years of the National League's formation, allied 
women were more active than working women. All leadership was dominated 
by these women including all officials and members of the executive board. 
Many young working women had joined between 1903-1907 but their role was 
minor and their membership usually temporary. These trends were not over-
looked, however. To stem the flow of incoming enthusiastic college graduates 
into leadership positions, one upper class member requested a quota system 
limiting the number of allied members in the organization and commit-
ment by allies to endorse a principle of closed shop. Although this 
resolution did not pass, they did have a provision in their constitution 
that working class women were to hold a majority of executive board positions. 
-48-
They could not meet this standard for a long time yet continually worked 
to achieve it by actively recruiting working women. 51 
By 1907, more working class women had heard of the NWTUL and three 
of the League's five executive offices and a majority of the positions on 
the executive board were held by working women. By 1910, eight of the 
ten women on the executive board were working women, but numerical equality 
did not wipe out tipper class domin:lt-ion. Thcorctical-Iy, middle '.llld upper 
class women were there to learn about the experiences of being working 
women and many sincerely tried to do this. Yet when it came to organizing, 
speaking, and diplomacy; middle and upper class women assumed immediate 
control, one reason being their self-assuredness as a result of their 
education and upbringing. 
Although allies were generally ten years older than union women, both 
groups were usually single and had strong alignments with women's interests. 
The class division, while very deep, never devcstated the organization and 
alignments in elections and policy decision were never divided straight 
across class lines. There is no evidence to support the contention that 
working women saw the League as a labor union and that allies viewed it 
as a social reform organization.. In fact, the persistent concurrence of 
these elements in the League was the root of the discord. This aspect 
will be brought up under a discussion of WTUL ideology. 
Membership make-up, as one can see, provides useful insight into group 
potential. Middle class interests dominated both groups and although 
the NWP was extremely radical in its strategy, the class composition of 
the organization made it impossible for them to connect their oppression 
with poor wome_u t S oppression.. NWP members avoide-d issues of race and pov-
erty and viewed legislative reforms such as suffrage and the Equal Rights 
Amendment as the path to liberation when, in reality, it was the path to 
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the white privileged woman's liberaLiun. At ail NWP convention in 
Washington a group of black women came forward in an appeal for their 
needs for the vote. Not wanting to alienate white southern women, 
Paul tried very hard to ignore them and largely succeeded. Afterwards, 
she referred to them "simply (as) an interruption, an obstacle to the 
smooth working of the machine."Sl 
Combined classes in the NWTUL was in some ways, extremely advantageous 
in terms of allies' money, influence, connections and power. However, 
by encouraging Socialist women to destroy the conditions that generated 
revolt and engage in work that was unradical and even counter-revolutionary, 
allies unintentionally prevented working class women from developing a 
class consciousness. It may also be argued though, that conditions in 
America precluded a socialist movement at that time, that American society 
was not fluid enough anymore to allow for substructural transformation as 
it had been in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. All 
in all, the NWTUL was the only branch of the woman's movement where middle 
and upper class women and immigrant, socialist, poor and uneducated women 
came together as sisters above all else. 
Strategy 
Strategy may be the most important movement variable as it is the one 
aspect of a challenge group which is made most explicit to the public and to 
the power structure. Given the membership total and the resources available, 
it is then up to the challenge group to determine tactics which will exert 
influence in the desired direction. The aspects of strategy which I will 
deal with on the theoretical level are expounded by William Gamson in his 
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discussion on degrees of radic;llislll <lnd tendency toward violence. 
Gamson defines radicalism as the "degree of threat to existing 
distributions of wealth and power." 52 The following four criterion 
are offered to define the degree of radicalism in a challenge group: 
Are these groups concerned with: 1) altering the scope of authority of 
all or some of its antagonists, 2) altering the procedures used by 
those antagonists, 3) replacing the personnel of its antagonists and/or, 
4) destroying or replncing nIl or some of its antagonists?53 If a group's 
concerns answer negatively to these questions., then their goals are said 
to be limited and concerned with changing the content of a certain 
policy. If anyone of these are answered positively, the goals are more-
than-limited and challenge authority structures. Along the same lines, 
Gamson found that intent to displace antagonists was positively correlated 
with a group's failure of success. It is important to note that groups with 
more-than-limited goals do not necessarily aim to displace antagonists 
but those that do fare significantly poorer. 
Some interesting facts illuminate consequences of violence used 
by or toward challenge groups. A common myth surrounding challenge group 
violence is that it emerges out of a frustration and as an angry and 
desperate last resort. This is, however, not the case; violence is more 
an act _of impatience "born of confidence ailU risil~g efficacy rather than 
the opposite. ,,54 Groups who will use violence perceive it to be a relatively 
safe strategy. 
Gamson's study revealed higher-than-average success results for groups 
exercising violence. These groups tended to be large protest groups while 
the recipients of violence tended to be smaller groups (under 10,000), 
perceived to be weak and vulnerable. This point is of vital importance: 
groups which receive violence are attacked not only because the power struc-
ture perceives them as threatening but because they are vincible and may not 
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survive the attack. 
The dichotomies implied by these factors will aid in comprehending 
the dissimilar strategies which the NWP and the NWTUL employed. Funda-
mental to this analysis is the group's specific target of influence; to 
whom did the organization decide to designate as the authority structure 
upon whom influence would be exerted? Obviously, the complexity of a 
system such as that of the United States, preculdes any clear-cut authority 
representation on which groups can focus their strategy. Both groups 
targetted different authorities and used group-specific tactics, thereby 
enhancing or diminishing potential for influence and social change. 
As discussed earlier, NWP tactics differed considerably from most 
other groups during this time period. However, many of the efforts they 
undertook were nellhcr novel nor etipecially dari.llg. Muc.h of their energy 
went into mainstream lobbying techniques and deputations to the President. 
Using demonstrations and press bulletins, they publicized the issue to 
the public and succeeded, to a great extent, in rekindling interest in the 
suffrage issue. During the Congressional election when they sought to reach 
Western voting women, NWP members placed ads on movie house screens, used 
billboards and put banners across the streets, developed a literature 
campaign distributing pamphlets and leaflets to women in urban and rural 
areas and finally, prepared a comprehensive text-book which explained why 
women should vote with the NWP. Excerpts were submitted to editors of 
major newspapers in all western states~55 
On another level, they conceived of extremely creative and witty 
devices to publicize their issue. For instance, on Valentine's Day of 
1916, and shortly after President Wilson had been re-elected, NWP members 
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hounded Congressmen with clever valentines urging support for the suffrage 
amendment~ Examples of these valentines arc as follows: 
To Congressman Edward Slevens Henry 011 liIe Huuse Rules Cummittee: 
H is for Hurry -
Which Henry should do. 
E is for Every -
Which includes Women too 
N is for Now 
The moment to act. 
R is [or Rules -
Which must bend to the fact. 
Y is for You 
With statesmanlike tact. 
To Congressman Thomas Sutler Williams, House Judiciary Committee: 
Oh, will you will us well, Wi 11, 
As we will will by you, 
If you'll only will to help us 
Put the Amendment through! 
To Congressman Edward William POll, House Rules Committee 
The rose is red, 
The violet's blue, 
But VOTES are better 
Mr. Pou. 56 
Another imaginative plan occurred during Wilson's annual address to 
the House of Representatives on December 6, 1916. At a carefully planned 
moment, a large yellow banner unfurled before the President reading, IIMr. 
President - What will you do [or woman suf[rage'!" As it came down, a 
messenger from the NWP appeared at the door of the press gallery and gave 
the door-keeper copies of an article detailing the purpose of the banner 
and Wilson's responsibility to American ,;;..;romeu. 
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To be sure, these methods were not completely representative of 
the NWP. More import.anL LilaH lhese efforLs Lu cooperaLe wiLh the govern-
ment using clever but moderate tactics, were the ingenious and unprecedented 
schemes they used which served numerous functions. Before addressing 
what these func tions were, let us turn to the strategies themselves. 
One must remember, moreover, that NWP members refused to present themselves 
as mild-mannered, fragile wives and mothers. They struggled to distinguish 
themselves from other women's orgnniz<ltions and were well aware of the 
contrasting images of themselves as opposed to NAWSA members, for instance. 
Alice Paul referred to NAWSA members as "old-fashioned, indirect, slave-
minded and feminine"57, the last adjective meant to be particularly 
insulting. 
The first ac tiv ity of this sort was picketing in front of the White 
House for ten months. Although this was the most spectacular feat, it 
also proved to be the most expensive. Bringing NWP women in from allover 
the country, feeding them and prnvid Lng them wi.th rooms was extremely 
costly. Yet the effort was perceived to be worthwhile. Paul, anxious 
to begin the picketing, knew it would not be popular but was excited 
about the fervor it would create and the way in which it would dramatize 
the issue. Determined, she felt that "picketing would provide a constant, 
direct and public appeal made at a place where the President and the public 
could not fail to se it." 58 
From this act came the arrests and the intense and violent attacks on 
NWP members. Leaving aside at this point the reasons for this blatant 
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display of authority abuse, it is quite important to examine the extreme 
dedication members felt toward the organization. Once arrested, group 
members took great risks in the courtroom by remaining absolutely silent 
or by delivering long tirades on the righteousness of womanls suffrage. 
They also refused to pay fines, get l.1wyers or even offer their names. 
The confused court sentenced them each to one day in prison yet neither 
this punishment nor the subsequent harsher ones deterred them; they 
immediately resumed picketing. 
Once in jail, they attempted to gain another advantage, to secure 
for themselves the status of political prisoners. As political prisoners, 
they would be exempt from prison work, would have the legal right to consult 
counsel (which had been denied them), could receive food and letters 
from the outside and would be permitted to .receive books, newspapers, 
and visitors. 59 
They wished to establish themselves as political prisoners to show 
the public that "the very fact that we can be sentenced to such long terms 
for a political offence shows that there does exist, in fact, a group of 
people who have come into conflict with state· power for dissenting from 
the prevailing social system. ,,60 They wanted to make sure that the 
picketing for which they had been arrested would go on record as a political 
crime. This extremely radical and provocative statement reflected their 
implication that a structural and institutionalized oppressive force was 
at work against the NWP and others like them. 
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This brings one to the next CiJse in point: NWP radi.calism. As 
Gamson claims, goals of displacing the antagonist are highly radical and 
subject to failure. The NWP, fairly early in their existence, target ted 
the Democratic Party and undertook massive campaigns to remove Democratic 
Congressmen and President Wilson from their elected positions by virtue of 
Democratic party affiliation. This strategy was unprecedented in America 
and shocked many people, especially the NAWSA. Few people could understand 
why the NWP would oppose individual Congressmen who had proven themselves 
loyal to the suffrage issue, just bcc;Juse they were Democrats. 
In the eyes of NWP members, the Democratic Party had to be defeated 
because it alone was responsible for the failure of the suffrage amend-
ment. Actually, this idea was quite logical. Given that a Democratic 
government was in power and given that suffrage had not been promoted 
enough to be debated in Congress, the appropriate conclusion was that if 
blame was to be placed on anyone, it would certainly be on the party in 
power, the Democrats. 
Responding to NAWSA's accusation that party control was not nearly 
as definitive in America as in Britain, the NWP responded that all 
committees in the Senate and the House of Representatives controlled 
legislation and had Democratic. chairmen. Moreover, the Democratic Party 
drew up all legislative programs .:lnd decided which measures would be voted 
on. 61 
Far from being arbitrary, their strategy was well-planned and well-
executed. Sending NWP women out west to establish headquarters served 
many functions. They succeeded in publicizing the issue of a federal 
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amendment and by their continual attacks upon Democrats, made big news 
in local newspapers. On the negative side, Paul so drastically under-
estimated conditions out west that she sent eighteen organizers to cover 
all the western states; the women became exhausted and desperate and could 
not possibly influence votes to the degree tha t would have been necessary 
for such a strategy to work. 
One of their most basic problems was that their strategy did not 
provide supporters with any alternative. This indicates a lack of sophis-
tication in their analysis and is a blatant example of their tendency to 
reduce situations to somewhat extreme parodies to expose incongruities 
in a system and to publicize the outcome merely for its effect. Furthermore, 
once it became clear that repressive authority forces were at work, the 
NWP extended their confrontational tactics to dramatize the radical 
cause. That is, they anticipated reactionary governmental retaliation 
and hoped that radicalized liberals would come to their support. 62 
As important as thei.r attitude toward Democrats, was their insistence 
upon working for a federal suffrage amendment rather than the state-by-
state effort which the NAWSA had been pursuing. A significant amount of 
citizens and Congressment were opposed to the federal amendment since they 
felt it infringed upon states' rights. In response to this touchy question, 
the NWP assured those concerned individuals that the federal amendment would 
not infringe upon states' rights, that the Constitution would call for 
final ratification by stateS. 
The outcome of these act-ivities, as Gamson might have predicted, were 
not terribly successful for the NWP. Although they claimed to displace a 
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few Congressmen, election resulls proved LItem wrong. They probably dId 
achieve the amount of education they claimed they asserted 63 but overall, 
people were terribly resistant to this type of strategy and either ignored 
it or fought it in the press. 
As shown above, the major thrust of most of the NWP's strategies 
was to expose the hypocracies inherent in institutional systems including 
other women's political groups such as NAWSA. Rather than offer tokens 
of respect to a government which did not even acknowledge their citizenship, 
their emphasis was on agitating systems of authority to the point of em-
barrassment and himiliation. 
There are two clear examples of this •. First, when it became clear that 
Washington officials were subjecting imprisoned NWP members to despicable 
prison conditions, many newspapers rushed to their defense and vehemently 
criticized these injustices. The NAWSA however, continued to dissociate 
tlH'll1sclves from Lhe 'jmmnttlrp' NWP wnm('n~ ,lJld insinu;ltl'd in their l:iterature 
that they were finally getting wl,at they deserved. In so doing, the NAWSA 
gave implicit consent to this repressive government policy. In the light 
of the media's defense of the NWP, NAWSA was made to look reactionary in 
comparison. So directly or indirectly, the NWP , through their conspicuous 
actions, were able to use public opinion to expose such inconsistencies. 
The second example rs the connections the NWP sought to make between 
the concept of America's fight for democracy abroad (World War I) and the 
conspicuous lack of it on the home front (suffrage). They used their 
picketing as an opportunity to draw these links and many of the placards 
carried by picketeers had extremely implicating slogans on them. Seen 
by many people as a repulsive display of anti-patriotism during a national 
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crisis, the NWP merely exploited the moral and self-righteous nationalism 
occurring during this period, and applied it to a domestic issue. 
A few introductory remarks can be made on the strategies utilized 
by the NWTUL. Generally speaking, they were not particularly imaginative 
in their struggle for reforms. As mentioned previously, the League 
witnessed the different types of techniques which the IWW used in the 
Lawrence Strike and, although very impressed by them, never actually 
exploited their potential. Seeking reforms within the legislative arena, 
they did have a unified purpose, but there was no underlying analysis 
or future-oriented pl,m. Certainly, their work was indispensable, but 
theirs was a totally reactive psychology. They never entered a strike 
unless invited nor did they ever agitate for one. This prevented them 
from being in the forefront of a very powerful labor movement. 
There are two general areas of concern with NWTUL strategy. First, 
one should look at the two distinct structural phases in their evolution 
and second, at their relationship with the American Federation of Labor. 
By doing so, one gains clearer insight into the ultimate lack of success which 
the NHTUL experienced in terms of achieving their original goals of 
organizing women into trade unions. 
The first phase of the NWTUL emphasized organizing women into trade 
unions. This emphasis On the actual organization of women in specific 
labor struggles almost vanished in the second phase (1913), when middle 
and upper class domination, at its height, stressed educating women in 
areas relevant to unionism. Legislative efforts were also strengthened 
during this phase. These activities were not harmful in themselves but 
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they did detract from union activities and reflected an overwhelming 
stress on the importance of knowledge and education as tools to persuade 
and convince the opposition. The early phase then, downplayed women's 
special problems in labor, and concentrated on integrating working women 
into the labor movement. Later on, they worked to implement demands 
relevant to women workers thereby highlighting gender distinction. 
As noted in Chapter 1, the NWTUL was always on hand in various cities 
to help striking women in all possible ways. League members came to the 
scene of each strike and within a short period, had gained the respect 
of workers so that their name awl capabilities were well known. Their 
concentration on publicity and public opinion reflected special interest 
in making certain that the public was informed and sympathetic. 
By raising relief funds, bail money, and patrolling streets to protect 
striking women from harrassment, League members were a vehicle througn 
which dissatisfied women strikers could organize and fight for better 
working conditions. Once again, the importance of this function should 
not be minimized. The drawbacks become apparent though, when one con-
siders the prospects for self-perpetuation. Although all challenge groups 
are bound by historical circumstance, it seems that the NWTUL made little 
effort to make a dent in the political system or labor movement. The 
major reason for this was their undeterred fidelity to the American Feder-
ation of Labor. 
As detailed in the section on the evolution of the NWTUL, the AFL had 
a powerful hold over the League's activities. They provided safety and 
security as a large, organized union to the decentralized NWTUL. However, 
the AFL never returned the services or loyalty which the NWTUL had provided, 
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namely, respect for women in the labor force and the full admittance 
of women into all unions. When it became obvious to the Leagues that 
they were merely a tangential branch of the AFL (and not even affiliated), 
they made a conscious decision to forego their own self-determination and 
to follow AFL orders blindly. Dissent was present of course. After 
the Lawrence Strike of 1912 Same women claimed that "many of those in 
power in the AFL today seem to be self ish, reactionary and remote from 
the struggle for bread and liberty of the unskilled workers. ,,64 However, 
this discontent never reached the proportions which could have precipi-
tated a split. 
The AFLts conservative and selfish tendencies were most evident when 
Gornpers refused to allow the League to organize unskilled workers, the 
majority of whom were women. Although they were well aware that this issue 
might terminate their already nebulous relationship, some women were 
determined to follow their consciences: "We have, in short, reached 
a crisis where the organization of the unskilled workers has become all-
important question in the labor movement. The organization of the unskilled 
is imperative and (its cost) must be borne in part by the organization of 
the skilled." 65 Many women resigned form the League because of such 
sentiments. 
However, the League I s leadership did not f eel they could risk their 
alliance with this most powerful organization and thus complied to AFL decree. 
It is no· wonder then, that the League, \.oJhlle never severing ties with the 
AFL, began to shift interest into a different realm, one which the federation 
was not threatened or actually touched by. Would the NWTUL have been more 
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successful had they attempted to organize women separately, apart from 
the AFL? It is difficult to say; perhaps, as independent organizing 
would have entailed far more risks, they would indeed have had more 
chances to fail. Yet it seems clear that the NWTUL was weakened by 
the AFL's dubious commitment and at times outright opposition to organ-
izing women. 
Another fundamental aspect of NWTUL strategy was the training schools 
they established for women workers. Provided with scholarship and 
encouragement, workers were able to study variouB diseiplines relevant 
to unionism. Most of the capital for these schools came from money raised 
byallies. 66 These schools were fairly successful, but the amoount of 
effort and resources channelled into them, limited the NWTUL's other 
activities. There was also a strong effort to teach women workers to 
be more cultured and to provide social activities for then. Reflecting 
a middle class bias, these activities were present throughout the group's 
duration. The Settlement House mentality pervaded the 1 eague' s dealings 
with working class women, and were internalized by these women. 
In summary, of the two groups, only the NWP was perceived by the 
authority structure to he vlllneLlhl(' t'!1ough to he constrained by violence. 
Of course, this was not done until they posed a threat great enough to 
warrant suppression. The NWTUL certainly experienced violence during the 
strikes they assisted. The labor movement, in its efforts to gain bargaining 
power, met with great resistence and women workers were not exempt. League 
members participating in strikes and p~otecting striking women were subject 
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to phsycial abuse., hut since it \,;;lS not. dir(,(,ted specifically toward 
them as an organiztion, it posed no threat to their existence. 
Violent authority control over the NWP was provoked by the group's 
persistent harrassment and humiliation of the men in power. The con-
sequence of this was to strengthen ties between group members and to 
reaffirm their commitment to the N\\1P. Moreover, muckrakers of the time 
swayed public opinion to the NWP's favor by revealing repressive authority 
mistreatment. 
The degree o[ radicalism in the NWTUL was much less than in the NWP. 
With limited goals, the League sought to assist in the essential task of 
improving workers' conditions. There was no attempt to displace antagonists 
nor to alter, in any way, fundamental distributions of power and wealth. 
The labor movement, as a whole, had secured enough of a power base to 
ensure acceptance by the public and the government of the League's 
presence in union activities. 
The NWP was more radical in their attempt to remove authorities from 
positions of power. In fact, that was their essential strategy. They 
challenged, still more than the NWTUL, the legitimacy of authority systems 
by constantly pointing to hypocracics in the power structure. Yet their 
middle class values precluded an strategic efforts toward initiatIng 
sub-s truc tur al tr ansforma tions. Clearly, though, they were perceived 
by the general public and by other American women 1 s organi,zations as 
extremely radical and provoc.ative. 
Ideology 
Even before Alice Paul and her followers officially split from the 
NAWSA, there was an obvious ideological schism between the two groups. It 
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was not only a matter of NAI</SA disapproval of NWP tactics but a more 
basic tension between each group's perception of women's role in society 
and, more specifically, to what extent women should break from their 
societally defined roles. The NWP was perceived by the public as the 
'guerilla fighters of the woman's movement' and never attempted to alter 
this impression. 
Although the NWP never attempted to systematically analyze women's 
oppression under capitalism or even the Lonc.:cpt of patriarchy to its full 
extent, members certainly challenged exisLing societal norms wiLh Lhelr 
behavior and self-concept. Standing outside the Progressive social 
feminist stream, their idea of what suffrage stood for was drastically 
different from all other women's groups. They were not working to gain 
suffrage so that womanly influence would be absorbed into the governmental 
structure. They worked on this single issue as a demand that the government 
remove all restrictions upon women so that they could be as free and 
independent as men were to pursue their interests and livelihood. The 
NWP's major concern was "to wipe every sex distinction, even those in 
favor of women, from the state and national statues. 1167 
One should not assume though, that these women had gender identifica-
tion problems and wished to be men. Rather, they were outraged by the 
injustice of such blatant reinforcement of unequal opportunities between 
women and men. These were women who, for the most part, were highly educated 
with elevated expecta'tions of gratification in their life. It is no wonder 
that they saw suffrage as such an essential piece of legislation. The concept 
of suffrage and its attainment then, was transformed into an end in itself 
becoming more important to the NWP than the equality it was supposed to 
secure. 68 
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Their concept of womanhood was perfectly consistent with that of 
the British feminist movement (with whom Paul was connected) and the 
early suffrage movement in America in the mid-lSODs. These women 
rejected the precept that women were bound in a selfless sisterhood 
that viewed the state as a large family. This notion was one of the 
major elements which made feminism respectable by the early 1900s. 
Women who perpetuated this notion though, were not alert to the dangers 
of reinforcing the feminine mystique and of concluding that women were 
so different than men as to require special protective laws. Social 
feminists also laid themselves open to the criticism that they wanted 
equality in politics but prefcrc,ntial treatment in industry. This 
accurately depicts the weakness of an argument that begins by accepting 
the opposition's premise. 71 
Therefore, the NWP' s sharp dc-via tion from the prevailing ideology 
served to reinforce the cohesiveness ;lrHJ der(~nsfvencss of its membership .. 
NWP members were ardent feminists and placed women's interests above 
everything else. While social feminists were working for child labor 
reforms and temperence laws as well as assisting the poverty-stricken 
in settlement houses, the NWP was the only organization, apart from the 
NAWSA, to concentrate solely on women's issues. Here, however, the similar-
ity between the NWP and the NAWSA ends. 
The NAWSA accused the m.p of playing partisan politics. By targetting 
the Democratic Party, the NWP was thought to be alLLgning with Republicans; 
actually, this was not the case. The ~P campaign text-book explained 
that their policy was strictly non-partisan and that if the Republican 
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Party were in power they would be targettccl in the same way.72 According 
to the NWP, party loyalties had to be obliterated and replaced with even 
stronger loyalties to a women's political bloc. The only way they felt 
this could be achieved was by making every effort to mobilize women 
together around a singular issue. 
This ideology paved the way for the creation of the Woman's Party 
which manifested all of these sentiments. Members of the NWP thought 
that the power elite was ignorant ,lIld unconcerned with their needs and 
decided to go outside of the t\'/o-party system (Note: not the party system). 
They began to develop a party concerned with women's needs only. lbis 
party would not be parallel to the Democratic or Republican Parties 
but would have a completely original format. Paul said, "We have a defi-
nite goal to reach and we cannot reach the goal over either the Democratic 
or Republican road. To reach our goals, (we need) a third party, a permanent 
political party. Homen are over one-half of the population of this 
country and we believe that half should have its own political organiza-
tion to stand for its own aspirations,. and ideals, and political beliefs ... "73 
This women's party would not sponsor a candidate and its only plank 
would he the enfranchisement of American women. "Peace, war, tariff, 
personalities; let us take no stand on these issues until after the women 
of this nation can stand behind us."74 The object was to secure suffrage 
by creating a single bloc vote of western voting women. They hoped to 
push these women' to refuse to participate in any state or municipal elections, to 
only vote NWP, solely attempting to influence the Presidential and 
Congressional elections in the west. 
Public response to this new party was essentially negative. 75 First, 
a party based along sex lines was repugnant and shocking to many women and 
men. Fears of eventual separatism between men and women quickly entered 
people's minds. Western non-member voting women, to whom the NWP was 
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appealing, were, for the most part, opposed to a woman's party due to 
geographic loyalties. They thought the NWP was certain to be controlled 
by detached eastern women who knew nothing of their situation in the west 
and were never motivated to place their votes with the struggling party. More 
important than their success or lack thereof is that the NWP identified 
themselves as women above all other affiliations; they attempted to establish 
women as a separate and unique class. 
NWTUL ideology differed drastically from the NWP' s. Although they 
were both interested in improving the status of women, they each held 
specific ideas about what it was that held women back and what might lead 
to their emancipation. This sentiment was articulated very nicely by a 
NWTUL member who said that "for the business and professional women, who 
are highly trained and relatively few in number, equal opportunity with 
men would seem to be mainly a matter of removing restrictions based on 
sex prejudice.. For the masses of women in industry., the chief inequalities 
are due to differences in bargaining power, [irst between the woman wage-
worker and her employer, and secondly between working men and working women. 1176 
One of the most striking aspects of the NWTUL is that the organization 
seemed to be caugh t in a number of dicha tomies. That is, there were 
contradictory pruposes existing in the NWTUL which were never confronted 
and resolved. 
The first set of elements at variance with each other is linked to one 
of the basic reasons for their existence. From their inception, the WTUL 
stressed the importance of interpretting the needs and objectives of the 
laboring classes to middle and upper class women. Reasoning that the separ-
ation created by the antagonism of class differences alienated women from one 
another, the middle and upper class leadership of the League idealized a 
situation whereby working women would share their experiences and thereby 
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help allies empathize with the working woman's plight. 
What resulted was a peculiar combination of romanticizing the working 
women's poverty on the one hand and also viewing them as piteous creatures. 
For example, in 1905, Agnes Nestor, a member of the Chicago League, was 
asked to speak before a convention of the Illinois State Federation of 
Women's Clubs. This was the first instance of an industrial woman appearing 
before a group of club women. She spoke to the them about factory work 
nnd the life of <1 working woman. The audience Wt1S vcry moved and impressed 
with thls new facet of reform work. 77 
An insightful allied leader wrute, HI[ Ute League Is to grow until 
it becomes the universal expression of the woman's participation in organized 
labor, then the privilege of assisting with financial help (allies) the 
ordinary activities of the League, can be hers only during the infancy of 
the body. No organization can draw its nurture permanently from sources 
outsideof itself.,,78 These sentiments indicate how allies viewed working 
women as the core of the League and themselves as vehicles or tools for 
working class women's own self-defined liberation: organizing themselves 
into affiliated unions. 
On the other hand, there was a substantial effort to make trade unionism 
respectable. Clearly, one can sec a consistent progression of this 
imposition of allies' values onto working class women. L\llies felt that 
if they could, in some way, raise unions to a middle class institutional level, 
working women would benefit from a heightened self-concept. Hence, the aims 
were not only to expose them to culture but also, unintentionally of course, 
to undermine any serious discontent. TIH! i::;suc uf class intercs t is crucial 
here. Allied women had certain interests to protect and as genuine as 
their concerns were for working women, they had no intention of relinquishing 
their place in society; they had vested interests in maintaining the status 
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quo. 
The most pronounced contradictions \vithin NWTUL ideology was their 
loyalty both to the feminist movement and to the labor movement. To 
start with, the League ':llways considered themselves to he necessarily 
linked to the woman t s movement. As it happened, "it was concerned women 
in the women's movement who became interested in the special problems of 
women wage-earners 1179 and not organizers in the labor movement becoming 
sens i tizcd to the samc. T1Il: LL'':lguv t S COI1lJll i.tllll'n t Lo the suf frage ;lmendmcn t 
was deeply held by all members. TileY were Invl ted to and present at all 
major inter-group women's conferences, including international conferences. 
Obviously, their dedication to women's needs pervaded all of their 
actions. They compiled an extremely concise analysis of women's unique 
and inferior place in the labor force and the obstacles they encountered 80 • 
Organizing men, they claimed, is more clear-cut; either a man is a trade 
unionist or not. With women, the situation is more osbcured. First, 
most women, more married than single, work in the home (theirs or others), 
and since a home is not considered to be a work-place, they are not con-
sidered wage-earners. 
The second explanation is the tendency for male unionists to discourage 
women from organizing themselves because of the implied permanence and conunit-
ment to the job situation. Union men, afr/aid that women might steal jobs 
away from men, often refused to admit women into their unions and, as 
evidenced by the AF of L, made no effort to encourage women to organize 
separately. Many women themselves resist organizing because they may see 
their work as temporary and their income as supplementary, even if this is 
no t the case. 
-69-
Thus, it is in this realm that the League faltered ideologically 
and hence, strategically. The contradictions implied by allegiances to 
both the woman's movement and to the labor movement were never confronted. 
Members of the League were torn hetween considering themselves workers 
or feminists first. League members felt incomplete either way. If a 
member devoted herself to issues which concerned only women workers, like 
protective legislation and suffrage, she was <Jccuseu or dividing the 
working class. (Note: the AF of L was not opposed to these issues but was 
hostile toward women who made them their highest priority). Yet if she 
stayed away from women's issues she was guilty of ignoring women's real 
problems in the work force. 81 
The issues themselves were very complicated. In February of 1922, 
the League called a Conference of trade union women to discuss the Equal 
Rights Amendment proposed by the NWP. The Conference resolved to oppose 
the amendment on the grounds that such a IIblanket legislation would 
probably be construed as invalidating labor laws which applied to women 
and not to men, <lnd that inequalities should be removed by specific 
measures without sacrificing laws which working women consider benefic.ial. 1182 
Some members, before joining the League, had tried to cooperate with 
organized women in general. It is impossible to generalize where members 
stood on this issue of dual exploitation. For example, Helen Marot, secre-
tary of the national organization and an ally, viewed women workers as 
workers, first and foremost. She felt that any other perspective would 
divide and impede class solidarity. The woman worker should be inseparable 
from the male worker. ' 
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There were also women like Harriet Stanton lliatch and Leonora 
O'Reilly who represented another strain in Wl'UL idology. Blatch, an 
ally, viewed unions as only one 3spect of women's problems. The primary 
issue was the va tc; cL:1sS issues were to be subord i.nated. 0' Reilly, who 
was a wage-earner, similarly felt that only with the vote could women 
obtain the much-needed respect in the labor movement. She felt very 
strongly about t.he necessity for org;Hlizlng women and rcnlizcd tiwt any 
attempt had to be both feminist and labor-based82 . For the majority of 
women workers, the issue was not as clear-cut. Workers identified with their 
class backgrounds but there was also a strong feminist consciousness among 
them (although working class women were less likely to have been involved 
in the organized women's movement. They appreciated the League as it 
"gave them more opportunities for responsible, autonomous roles than the 
male-dominated unions."83 
This underlying tension to resolve the issue of dual exploitation 
(were women workers oppressed because they were workers or because they 
were women?) was never addressed systematically. In retrospect, it 
appears clear that the optimal solution would have been to reject the 
'either/or' analysis and create a synthesis combining both facets of the 
woman wage-earners' exploitation. This would have demanded a complex 
theoretical analysis based on the above fac tors. Unfortunately, this 'vas 
never accomplished and resulted in an unnecessary fragmentation in NWTUL 
ideology. * 
* This is very similar to what is occurring in the contemporary feminist 
movement. Many WOmen are caught between a class theory viewing capitalism 
as the most oppressive system, and a radical feminist view which perceived 
men (patriarchy) as the primary oppressors preceeding even capitalism. 
Attempts to synthesize a Marxist class analysis with a feminist analysis 
have been few and fairly reductionist but at least the efforts are being made. 
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A salient point in comparing the Ldeology of the NWP and the NWTUL 
is the way in which each group felt that women's needs could best be met. 
The NWP started from a self-determined middle class perspective and 
wished for men and woman to be equal under the law so that women could 
actualize their potential. The NWTUL~ opposing this ideology, was more 
in line with the mainstream definition of womanhood as a dependent group 
to be protected. The ideal woman was selfless and worked for social 
change on a broad level and not merely for something whLch would benefit 
only herself. Although suffrage was their only major issue, NAWSA even 
differed with the NWP in their view of its importance; they saw suffrage 
as a crucial reform which would lead not only to women's improvement, 
but even more importantly, to society's betterment as well. As an example, 
one of the planks listed in the WTUL' s ConsLltution is the belief in 
the organization of all workers, not only women. 84 
One of the NWTUL's most basic problems was that any possibility for 
a collective idology was negligible due to the tensions created by women's 
dual exploitation. Perhaps they might have chosen one allegiance over the 
other for a more consistent doctrine to which they could have committed 
themselves. For instance, the LC:1gue could have cultivated stronger 
ties to the WOman I s movement anJ developeJ enougl"l resources to organize 
women in unions apart from the AF of L. This might have strengthened the 
organization immeasurably and given them a single feminist-oriented 
direction without negating their intrinsic labor connections. 
At any rate, this led to a less-ttlan-unified organization. The NWP 
had no such problems; they focused on one type of oppression, the oppression 
that they suffered as women. This narrower vision may have been fallacious 
in terms of ignoring the trans-class, trans-racial differences, but it 
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certainly united the members in a way the League was never able to do. 
Whnt is somewhat ironic is that the NWP with lUi solely feminist 
perspeclive, wanled Lo consolidaLe all wumen as Ll. polilical bluc buL thc.y 
never actually proved themselves capable of attracting all kinds of 
women. At least the NWTUL attempted to unite different classes of 
women, to expose them to each other's problems and needs. However, the 
League's problems were compounded by the fact that members thought they 
would transcend class boundaries and avoid inter-group friction. These 
two groups contrast in major ways and represent divergent feminist 
ideologies during the Progressive Era. Obviously, neither group was 
able to create an ideology which could answer to needs of women of all 
classes. 
Leadership 
In light of the infonnation on leadership which has been dispersed 
throughout other discussions on the NlvP and NlVTUL, L will elaborate only 
on the most central elements of this variable. What is most intriguing 
is that the links between all of the movement variables are personified in 
the type of leadership or leadership network which a group boasts. As a 
point of departure, Robert Tucker provides valuable acumen into the 
nature of charismatic leadership. Tucker states that the "key to charis-
matic response lies in the distress that followers experience. II and that 
Hthe charismatic leader is one in whom, by virtue of unusual personal 
qualities, the promise or hope of salvation-deliverance from distress-
appears to be embodied. ,,85 
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These thoughts bring to mind Alice Paul's leadership of the NWP. 
It is safe to say that the NWP Wi1S indeed i1 charismatic movement. 
Tucker's criterio"n, by which one can judge a leader l s charisma, can be 
used to check the assertion. First, the leader must have visionary 
powers and must be able to communicate that vision as well. Second, 
s/he must have the usual leadership qualities cornman to any person who 
takes the responsibility of being in the fore of a group. Furthermore, 
Tucker states that the leader must have a peculiar sense of mission, a 
belief in the righteousness of the group's existence. From this, s/he 
must exude self-confidence and a sense of purpose. The leader must 
also accentuate the urgency of the group's plight; "oppression must 
be made still more oppressive; the shame still more shameful by publi-
cizing it." 86 
Alice Paul retained control over the NWP throughout its existence. 
As mentioned previously) Paul modif ied the organizational s true ture of 
the NWP, not to make it more democratic, but to consolidate her power 
and exercise control more effectively. Her leadership abilities fit 
neatly into the above model: Her powers of vision placed her at least 
one step ahead of other members. Whatever happened, whether it was an 
unsuccessful campaign or tactic, she immediately averted tensions by 
presuming and answering the unasked question - 'Where do we go from here?' 
Always with a plan detailing the next move, NWP members were dependent 
upon her vision. 
Any woman who came in contact with Paul was touched by her aura, by 
her exceptional talent for inspiring people to act. "Other leaders (of 
the woman's movement) were widely admired, even loved, but Miss Paul was 
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the only one whose example led women of all ages and stations to risk 
jail and worse. uS7 It is better to let members speak for themselves. 
Doris Stevens, a member who recorded the NWP's history, wrote: 
Itr realize how little we know about this laconic 
person, and yet how abundantly we feel her power, 
her will and her compelling leadership. In an 
instant and vivid reaction, I am either congealed 
or inspired; exhilirated or depressed; sometimes 
even eXClsperntcd, but a]w<1Ys moved." SB 
Stevens described Paul's appeal as 1I(} naked force, a vital force which is 
undefinable but of which one simply cannot be unaware."S9 
Another woman writes, "She is as impersonal to herself as she is to 
others. Others are better equipped for the foreground and for public 
applause. She puts them there. She herself remains in her office, 
planning the next spectacle studiously. There is no Alice Paul. There 
is suffrage. She leads by being - not by being for - by being her cause.,,90 
The intensity with which Paul led the organization and the high demands 
she placed on members created a certain anxiety which members internalized. 
In so doing, they absorbed feelings of distress and of urgency to accomp-
lish their goal. Along with this intensity was a quality of confidence 
which pervaded her actions, and which spread to all NWP members. 
The NWTUL contrasts sharply with the NWP in this realm. William 
Gamson, in a discussion of leadership,. notes that "decentralized groups 
lack such a single center of power. Typically ... there are chapters or 
divisions of the organization that maintain substantial autonomy and the 
freedom to decide whether or not to support collective action as a whole. ,,91 
To reiterate, "centralization of power ... is the way in which challenging 
groups deal with the problem of internal conflict through which they are 
able to achieve unity of command. ,,92 To understand NWTUL leadership, one 
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must recall the League's decentralized structure and the locally-oriented 
nature of their struggle. 
Many great leaders sprang from the NWTUL or from local branches. Allies 
and working women such as Agnes Nestor~ Melinda Scott, Leonora O'Reilly, 
Rose Schneidermann, and Margaret Drier Robbins tlere a few of the women 
who dedicated the greater parts of their lives to helping women wage-
earners participate more actively in unionism and to lead fuller, more 
enriched lives. What is unique to the NWTUL is that there was no opportun-
ity for one woman to emerge as a central dominating figure. 
Margaret Drier Robbins was President of the National League from 
1907-1922. Members loved and respected her yet she did not possess the 
same qualities which commanded the awe and total commitment that Alice 
Paul had. Her rhetoric was just that; it was full of religious undertones 
and feminine moralism. As an example, the following is a quote from one 
of her speeches: 
"Today, as yesterday, when there is no V1Slon the people 
perish and today, as yes tC'rday, the spir i t mus t be horn 
to see the vision, to hold it, to live and die for it. 
10 rele.ase and set free this spirit, ... to bring hope, faith, 
courage to those held in bondage and crushed under the weight 
of wrong and to give them the message, 'to you, too, has 
been given dominion over life,' this is our task. ,,93 
The rhetoric is timeless and universal; any leader could be delivering 
such a speech to any group at any time. The wording, representative of 
many of her speeches, seems empty and not particularly inspirational. 
However, Mrs. Robbins did not need to be inspirational as she was not 
expected to provide the complete guidance and direction as Paul was. 
In view of these facts, no single leader in the NWTUL was destined 
to be all-powerful. Many women carved places for themselves within the 
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WTUL on local levels" and stood out as astute organizers of womell. 
However, as a result of the League's decenLralization, the previously 
discussed need for 'defensive structuring' and 'unity of command' was 
non-existant. Alice Paul, on the other hand, distanced herself from 
members and was mythified by them. She conspicuously dictated every 
NWP move and kept her relations within the organiztion on an impersonal 
and business-like level. She was considered infallible and untouchable 
by her constituency. 
Chapter 6 
Authority Control of Discontent 
As indicated elsewhere, American society, because of historically-
based complexities, precludes any central targets for challenge groups 
to direct energies toward. A multitude of persons and institutions 
holding power exist; reflections of our pluralist society, and they 
offer platforms for discontent. As William Gamson states, "The brilliance 
of pluralist thinking is illustrated by its ability to handle multiple 
problems simultaneously - the prevention of dominance by a single group 
of individuals, responsiveness to the needs of its citizens, and the 
prevention of extreme or violent conflict. ,,94 Hence, the lack of domina-
tion by a single group and also the impermeability of the American system 
inhibit any fundamental changes being made. From this one can assume 
that the closer a protest group challenges fundamental social and economic 
relations, the greater the perceived threat to the system and the more 
resistence and control will be enforced against them. 
However, the ways in which a power group will exercise control over 
a challenge group is not at all clear-cut. "The constant use of open 
force is expensive, dangerous and does not lend itself to the gratification 
of other needs among those with great power.,,95 Many alternatives are 
available for social control, such as cooptation, violence, avoidance, etc. 
The central questions here are to whom is the challenge group targetting 
its strategies and demands, to what extent the challenge group is threaten-
ing basic societal relations, and in what ways do power authorities choose 
to exercise social control? 
It may be helpful to briefly review Gamson's information on the relation-
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ship between social control and the amount of trust which authorities 
have toward different challenge groups. When trust is high and basic 
premises of both sides are cormnon, persuasion will most likely be used 
on thepart of authorities. The group, by virtue of their compatibility 
with the authority structure, may be said to be 'confident.' With neutral 
groups, "authorities are cast more in the role of broker or referee among 
competing groups." 96 However, with neutral groups, contraints are not 
necessary and hence, neutral groups are not alienated,. On the other end 
of the spectrum from confident groups, lie alienated groups. When 
underlying assumptions and trust do not exist, constraints are more likely. 
The most protective action an authority structure can take for itself is 
to prevent the group' s access to resources and their ability to use them. 
In this way, physical force as a means of social COntrol is not necessary.97 
The specific means of social control which will be referred to are 
punishment either through physical or rhetorical sanctions, cooptation, 
attempts to ignore the challenge group, or a modification of a previous 
decision to fit a persistent threat. The response to the NWP provides 
examples of all of these methods and through the evolution of the party, 
one can trace the progressive degrees of threat which this organization 
posed to the authority structure. 
Since the NWp·s tactics were, to a large extent, deviant from mainstream 
feminist strategies of the time periou, it "as fairly predictable that the 
government would not initially respond harshly but let public opinion 
judge and weaken the m~. The media and the public did, in fact, either 
ignore or ridicule the group's militant ideology of displacing the Demo-
cratic Congressmen. Hence, two strands of feminist organizations were 
pitted against one another. 
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When the NWP commenced their picketing in January, 1917, the begin-
ning of a continued series of threats to the government began to emerge. 
Initially, the picketing was thought to be harmless; twelve to fifteen 
women marched silently in front of the White lIouse every day. For six 
months they were ignored, but by mid-sunnner a new national consciousness 
was emerging, resulting from America's entrance into the World War. 
It was hardly a singular event which enraged the spectators, but 
banners like the following ccr Lllnly pray ided the necessary impetus to 
provoke a confrontation. This banner greeted a mission of Russian allies: 
"President Wilson and Envoy Roots are·Deceiving Russia. 
They Say, 'We Are A Demoeracy, Help Us Win The War So 
That Democracy May Survive.' 
We the Women 
A Democracy. 
The Right To 
Opponent Of 
of America, Tell You That America is Not 
Twenty Million American Women are Denied 
Vote. President Wilson is the Chief 
the National Enfranchisement. 
Help Us Make This Nation Really Free. 
Government It Must Liberate Its People 
Can Clnim Free Russian lis lin 1I11y,,98 
Tell Our 
Before It 
Other banners they used quoted President Wilson in an effort to make 
his statements appear ridiculous and contradictory to his behavior: 
"I tell you solemnly, Ladies and Gentlemen, we cannot 
postpone justice any longer in these United States, and 
I don't wish to sit down and let any man take care of me 
without my having at least a voice in it ... 
We shall fight for the things we have always held nearest 
our hearts - for democracy, for the right of those who 
submit to authority to have a voice in their own govern-
ment." 99 
Here then, lies the basis of their first threat to America. Entering 
a World War to fight for democracy was in many ways, too abstract. As 
indicated in Chapter Two, public opinion toward the war was not consolidated 
and great efforts were being made by the government to remedy this. Thus, 
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when a group of women were plaguing the White House and exposing the 
inherent inconsistencies of fighting a war for democracy abroad with 
the most obvious lack of it at home, the Administration justifiably 
became quite nervous. "As America I s role as a world leader of democracy 
became more significant, and as a number of European nations began to 
grant women suffrage, enfranchisement began to seem important for the 
nation t S image." 1 0 0 
The first attacks onthc NHP were by spectators and were harbingers of 
the more repressive action that was soon to be taken by the Administration. 
Thus, when it became clear that the vigilantes would not cease their 
attacks, the government was forced to step in. Entering cautiously, 
the Adminis tration ordered police to arres t the woman in hopes that the 
picketers would cease, yet they did not. 
Increasingly frustrated by the women's refusal to cooperate in court 
and their subsequent demands to be treated as political prisoners, the 
Administration realized that the women were becoming threats to the national 
security. In theoretical terms, the NHP was an alienated group in whom the 
Administration did not have much trust, and was appropriately accorded 
punishment by the authorities. With little at stake, the administration 
felt comfortable in activating negative sanctions against these women. 
The nature of these sanctions changed considerably over time, becoming 
progressively harsher. The arrested women were taken to Occoquan Horkhouse 
and subjected to cold cells, coarse prison clothes and inedible food. Hhile 
in prison, officials tried to extinguish morale among NWP members by per-
petuating various lies. For example, they were told that no effort was 
being made from the outside to reach them; second, that their attorney had 
been called off the casco Third, whIle the hunger strJkc was taking place, 
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each women, separated from the other, was told that she was the only 
one who was refusing food. 101 
It was evident that the Administration wanted to keep all the women 
separate and prevent them from organizing within the prison confines. 
Especially important was the attempt to separate Alice Paul, their leader, 
from the rest of the group. Placing Paul in the psychopathic ward was 
the utlimate display of the tilreClt "he represented to thc Cluthority's 
control over the women. By severing physical ties between Paul and her 
followers they felt the group would disintegrate. However, the women 
were suspicious of all these techniques and through an underground network 
of communication, they were able to spread information around the workhouse 
and outside of it. 
Upon learning of these activities, the newspapers generally sided 
with the NWP. A widely-held sentiment was expressed by the St. Paul 
Daily News. This article expressed concern that the sixteen NWP members 
were sentenced to serve 60 days each in the workhouse for criticizing 
the government. "Regardless of whether or not we agree with the women, 
we can only regard their arrest as a petty display of intolerance of criti-
cism, and an abridgment of fundamental rights of an American citizen •.. 
The American people will not be filled with greater enthusiams for a 
war for democracy abroad which begins with the suppression of democracy 
at home." 102 
The Boston Journal also commented on the arrests; 
"That higher authorities than the Washington police were 
responsible for the amazing policy of roughhouse employed 
against the suffrage pickets has been suspected from the 
very beginning ... ln our nation's capital, women have been 
knocked down and dragged through the streets by goverrunent 
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employees, including sailors in uniform. The police 
are strangely absent at such moments ... Perhaps the 
inscriptions on the suffrage banners were not tactful 
•.. But right or wrong, the suffragists in Washington 
are entitled to police protection, even though in the 
minds of the Administration they are not entitled 
to the ballot ... President Wilson's word would carry 
the question into Congress ... Would there be any harm 
in letting Congress vote OIl a Suffrage resolution? 
That would end the disturbances and it would make 
our shield of national justice somewhat brighter." 1 0 3 
The parallel had been drawn between the fight for suffrage and the 
fight for democracy in Europe. This parallel was further extended by 
thepress to include the violent suppression of the protest. This is 
precisely what the NWP had hoped to accomplish. Their threat was simply 
becoming too great. 
The NWPfs most harrowing experience occurred following the arrests 
of the forty-one women on November 14, 1917. News of this 'Night of Terror' 
was the event which fully triggered the sympathie.s of journalists. The 
tnle is inde(~d shock-ing. A \110m<l1l named M;lry Nol<ln, <1 71-ycar old NWP 
member described the evening: 
"It was about half past seven at night when we got to Occoquan 
workhouse. A woman was standing behind a desk when we were 
brought into (the) office, and there were six men also in 
the room. Mrs. Lewis, who spoke for all of us, refused to 
talk to the woman (who answered), 'You'll sit here all night 
then.' I saw men beginning to come up on the porch through 
the window. But 1 didn't say anything about it. (The 
woman) called my name, but I did not answer. 'You had better 
answer it or it will be the worse for you,' said one man. 
, I' 11 take you and handle you, and you'll be sorry you made 
me,1 said another. The police woman who came in with liS 
begged us to answer to our names. We could see she was afraid. 
Suddenly the door burst open and Whittaker rushed in like a 
tornado; some men followed him. We could see the crowds of them 
on theporch. They were not in uniform ... They seemed to come in 
and in and in •.• Mrs. Lewis stood up but she had hardly begun 
to speak when Whittaker said, 'You shut up! 1 have men here 
glad to handle you. Seize her!' I just saw men spring toward 
her. (At that point), I was jerked down the steps and away 
into the dark. It was very black. The other building, as 
we came to it, was low and dark ... We were rushed into a large 
room that we found opened on a long hall with brick dungeons 
on each side. 
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In the hall outside was a man called Captain Reems. 
He had on a uniform and was brandishing a stick as 
thick as my fist and shouting as we were shoved into 
the corridor. 'Damn you, get in here!' I saw Dorothy 
Day brought in. She is a very slight girl. The two 
men were twisting her arms above her head. Then 
suddenly they lifted her up and banged her down over 
the arm of an iron bench - twice. As they ran past me ... 
I heard one of the men yell, 'The _____ suffrager! My 
mother ain't no 5uffraser.1I r'll put you through ---
At the end of the corridor they pushed me through a 
door. I lost my balance and fell on the iron bed ... 
We had only lain there a few minutes trying to get our 
breath when Mrs. Lewis, doubled over and handled like 
a sack of something, was literally thrown in by two 
men. Her head struck the iron bed and she fell. 
... We were roughly told by the guard not to dare to 
speak agnin, or we woulJ he put in straight-jackets. 
We were so terrified we kept very still ••. Mrs. Cosu 
was desperately ill as the night wore on. She had a 
bad heart attack, and then vomiting. We called and 
called. We asked them to send our doctor because 
we thought she was dying; there was a woman guard 
and a man in the corridor, but they paid no atten-
tion ... ,,104 
This account was confirmed by all of the women involved. One can 
see then, from this chilling and most violent event, that the Administration 
would not permit anymore of their indolence. They saw no alternative but 
to take violent action against these women. Again, whether or not Pres i-
dent Wilson himself ac tually ordered these things to be done is not the 
point. The fact remains that he was aware of the arrests and convictions 
and was held accountable when the media received word of this abuse. 
Not only did the Administration at first attempt to ignore and 
then suppress their tactics, but another element of authority control was 
utilized as well. Twice, members of the authority structure modified their 
original decisions to control the women's discontent more effectively. After 
the first convictions, the court decided to pardon the women. Their original 
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intention, to scare the women into ceasing the picketing, was not meant 
to be taken any further. On another occasion, NWP members tried to 
rescue imprisoned members by obtaining a wr iL or haheus corpus to move 
the women from the Virginia prison to one in Washington. Washington 
officials were so nervous at the prospect of exposing the weakened women 
to public view that an emissary wa:,; sent by the Administration to NWP 
headquarters to "beg them" to wait a week in which time they would move 
the prisoners voluntarily. lOS Obviously, this attempt to modify a decision, 
which was refused by the NWP, stemmed from a justifiable fear that the 
frail women would shock the public and cause the women to be seen as 
martyrs. 
The NWP then, resisted repression and control as well as they could. 
In fRct, one mjRht vipw their unwi11ingness to 'behave themselves' in 
court as a resistcnce to cooptation. That is, a resistence to being 
absorbed into and accountable to a system to which they felt they did not 
belong. As Paul claimed, "We do not consider ourselves subject to this court, 
since as a unenfranchised class, we have nothing to do with the making of 
the laws which have put us in this position. III 06 
Challenging America' s claims which allowed citizens the right to 
protest was not the only threat which the NWP posed to the internal stability 
of the nation. In a more subtle and even fundamental way, the NWP was 
calling into question the very fuundation upon which society was built; the 
relations between men and women. Especially intensified during the war 
was the encouragement for 'men to do their part and for women to do theirs.' 
Moreover, the nuclear family was to be a major stronghold for Americans. 
Social controls become extremely magnified during a national crisis as 
a power structure wants to make certain that internal tensions do not 
'-leaken the country's morale and hence, decrease faith in the country's 
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leadership. This will be elaborated on later. 
In essen~c, the sLricLesL sucial cOllrrois were exercised by the 
AFL over the NWTUL. Although the AFL was largely indifferent to many 
NWTUL activities, they had an interest in keeping them dependent and 
working for them, rather than independently of them. Although individual 
members of the League may have felt inhibited and frustrated by the AFL, 
the League as an organization was forced to abide by AFL decrees because 
of their perceived need for AFL legitimacy and legitimization. 
On only a few occasions did the NWTUL seriously externalize their 
doubts as to the validity and efficacy of the alliance. On this occasion, 
as referred to earlier, the AFL ordered the League to withdraw their 
support from the Lawrence Strike of 1912. Complying with the order yet 
hesitant about their feelings, the potential [or inter-group conflict 
inereased. To allay a severing of ties, the AFL coopted the League by 
granting them $150.00 a month which they gratefully accepted. Still, 
they were never granted votes on the executive board nor were they 
granted official affiliated status. The League, then, was coopted into the 
AFL's ideology by trading off the right to oppose AFL policy for a monthly 
salary. 
Other powerful social controls were applied. For example, Samuel 
Campers, President of the AFL, wrote the National League a letter attacking 
them for their support of protective industrial legislation for women. The 
AFL felt it to be an "infringement upon individual freedom,,107 and thought 
it would endanger the liberty of male wage earners. However, as frustrated 
as they may have been, the League could not fully express their opposi-
tion because of the power imbalance. 
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The League's goals were in conflict with the general power (the 
government) insofar as they threatened the security of government and 
big business. Assisting strikes in progress, they were subject to many 
of the same negative sanctions which befell the strikers themselves. 
However, since their primary purpose was to assist the strikes, they were 
not perceived by the power structure as an autonomous group whose very 
existence was threatening. The League rose to meet particular crises, 
and their energies outside of this were directed to educating women in 
ways that were hardly threatening to the power structure. 
It is clear that with regards to the general power structure, the 
NWTUL shifted periodically from acting as a 'neutral' group to a 'confi-
dent' group. Basically, the League's goals were compatible with those 
of the authority structure. This however, is not to negate the powerful 
threat which the labor movement posed to authorities but after the first 
decade of the twentieth century~ trends were to check business monopolies 
and controls and to guarantee workers safe and humane conditions. The 
League and hence, the labor movement, was not demanding any fundamental 
alterations of distributions of wealth and power. Also, as the middle 
and upper class women brought their values and interests into the organiza-
tion, working class alms were l1loucraLcd, suhverted and perceived as less 
threatening. Cooptation was highly predictable for the NWTUL and occurred 
when prominent women were selected to serve on various national defense 
councils during the war. 
Although the NWTUL was less threatening than the NWP, points of 
commonality can be found which would have made both the AFL and the 
general authority structure similarly threatened by the women's 
organizations. Both groups I targets of influence were elites in-
safar as they maintained power over the women. Not only was the 
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NWP exposing the hypocricies of American democracy, it was also challenging 
the legitimacy of male domination and power. Likewise, the NWTUL was 
the first organization to respond to the needs of working women4 This 
underlying and subtle threat to the targets of influence was and is still 
not recognized as easily as are other types of threats. Let us explore 
this further. 
Woven throughout this paper has been an attempt to convey the different 
images which the NWP and the NWTUL have projected. Granted, these images 
contrast considerably, but the respec tive authorities' reac tions to their 
agitation stem from the same source, that is male-female dynamics in the 
existing society. First, it may be wise to highlight the two groups' 
conception of women as reflected in their strategies and ideologies. 
The NWP, through their insolent and militant behaVior, deeply offended 
the public. Repeatedly, one detects a revulsion toward NWP members who 
were declaring independence by resisting their societally designated roles. 
These were women who, for the most part, were not married and used tactics 
which were not only radical but extremely unfeminine as well. By refusing 
to conform to mores of docility, politeness, and patience, members of the 
NWP were highly threatening to society's concept of women, especially in a 
time period when social feminism or feminine feminism, was at its height. 
This sentiment is illustrated in the statement quoted above: "My mother 
ain't no suffrager.,,1?8 The NWP had clearly overstepped the boundary of 
propriety for women and much of the antagonism they received was due to 
this element. By extending their influence beyond the domestic sphere 
and into the public sphere, both groups of women were resisting male social 
concepts which kept them in the llOme. Simply in view of the fact that 
these women were mobilizing without men was a threat to the continuation 
of male domination. This factor must be considered in light of the public's 
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intense reactions to the groups (especially the NWP). 
However, the NWTUL did not go to such extremes; they clearly were not 
crossing over into male territory or shaking the structural foundations 
which placed women in a subordinate position. Never striving to assert 
themselves independently, the NWTUL was forced into a subservient 'feminine' 
role under their patriarch, the AFL. The League was constrained by placing 
their ultimate faith in the AFL, by assuming that men in the Federation 
were stronger, more experienced and could give the women the strength 
which they did not have On their own. Certainly, as indicated earlier, 
other important factors such as class were involved. Yet although the 
NWTUL did not, through their actions, threaten male social conceptions, 
their very existence must be considered an issue. The gender element 
is vital to an understanding of the complexities of male-female dynamics 
within the histories of both groups. 
As different as the NWP and Lhe NWTUL were, authority reaction, clearly 
portrays male antagonism toward fema.;Le mobilization. For instance, Gompers 
supported the belief that women had a right to work but held to the view 
that this right should not be exercised unless absolutely necessary. 
Furthermore, he contended that women's greatest contributions were to their 
homes, in the roles of wife and mother. As an example, he supported a 
Boston Local which forced women out of the core-making trade as he felt 
their participation would lead to the denigration of womanhood. 109 Women 
who wished to organize, as tame as this may seem today, were making a 
powerful statement at that time; that their work was worth organizaing 
for and that their particpation in the work force was valid and would be 
permanent. 
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Hence, the divergenc.es beLweell the M.Jl' ,:'lllU UtL' NWTUL LHJe SOHI(.:wltaL 
on this point. Both groups, in different ,,,ays and to varying degrees, 
were challenging certain male-defined premises. This is a particularly 
difficult factor to analyze in terms of authority's response to the 
challenge groups. Gender roles as opposed to class differences tend to 
be more abstract and difficult to monitor. Especially in the case of the 
NWP however, the issue of the role of women would seem necessary to an 
explanation of why such irrational violence was perpetrated upon them. 
Organizing a single-sex political party and pursuing aims in non-traditional 
ways for women only, anticipated threatening changes in stable male-
female relationships. The issue was augmented by the wartime propaganda 
which emphasized the stable and traditional funerican family. 
Chapter 7 
Sociology of Knowledge Perspec tIve: COil textual 
Constraints on the ffi,P and the ffiVTUL 
As one gains insight into the specific historical climate, 
the interaction between authorities and challenge group members 
gains increasing clarity. Each historical time period has a 
specific material reality which sets the stage upon which all events 
are enacted. Structures of thought and patterns of behavior both 
derive from and are constrained by economic, social and political or-
ientations or what are called "existential factors. illIG Generally 
speaking, Ifideas interact with existential [actors which serve as 
selective agencies, releasing or checking the extent to which 
political ideas find actual expression. "Ill 
In this respect, a tool for undcrs tanding challenge groups 
emerges. Starting [rom a premise: which assumes that the liberal and 
pluralist American Tradition is based on a Protestant work ethic, 
the historical trends which come out of this condition become 
discernible. Certainly, there is cyclical and perpetual exchange 
process transpiring but it is possible to single out important 
elements or events which most drastically constrain challenge groups. 
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One of the most important determinants of organizational structure 
was the Progressive emphasis on bureaucracy. American society, growing 
larger and more complex, sought efficient forms of organization. Max 
Weber attributes the following charac.teristicB to bureaucracies: special-
ization of workload, hierarchy of command, positions achieved on account 
of competence, rules and procedures for performance and career lines l12 . 
In conjunction with the development of bureaucracies were new propensities 
toward education and investigation. 
The NWTUL perfectly adhered to these qualifications. Although de-
centralized, the League's stress w~lS certainly on efficiency of organization, 
mostly to gain credibility. Perceiving the organization of society to 
be fundamentally just and ordered, the League emphasized the use of persua-
sion to educate and enlighten the public to the needs of union organization 
for women. Carrying out invcstigattnns, they had faith in the Progressive 
American process. They assumed that the 'facts ' , once attained and 
dispersed, would convince people of the need to change conditions accordingly. 
In other words, all social ills were definable and curable. One simply 
had to locate the problem, study it, and make recommendations to the 
appropriate persons whose job it was to carry out the policy. 
The NWP did not follow this path. Although they recognized the need 
for and developed a bureaucratic organization, (especially with branches 
covering the United States) they did not dwell on uncovering causes of 
problems in such a way. Their aims were more to shock and expose people 
into realizing the unavoidable necessity of enfranchising women. 
Since the NWP leadership had British roots and was comprised mainly 
of younger women, there was a greater likelihood of rebellion against 
externally imposed constraints. Younger, less integrated individuals are 
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more npt to nttnck the system. This indeed WilS the case. 1l3 
Another way in which American liberalism structured these two movements 
was their respective antagonisms toward radicalism. The NWTUL expressed 
the fear that: 
"If the whole burden of remedying unfair industrial 
inequalities is left to the oppressed social group 
we (may be left with) the crude and primitive method 
of revolution. To this the only alternative is for the 
whole community, through cooperative action, to under-
take the removal of industrial wrongs and the placing 
of industry on a basis just and fair to the workers.,,114 
This explicit confession of, perhaps, unconscious ulterior motives for 
middle and upper class participation in the League, reflects their attitude 
toward militancy and actual working class solidarity. The controls enacted 
to prevent a proletarian mobilization were strongly felt during this time 
period. 
Likewise, the NWP showed similar tendencies in the concentration on 
elevating the status of middle class white women only. The NWP had never 
thought to enlarge the nature of their analysis beyond the vote and beyond 
white middle class women. In fact, the NWTUL had greater potential for 
doing this but their history was part of a labor movement which had become 
increasingly conservative. In this way, it might be said that prevailing 
conditions dictated the demands that the WOIU('n could construct. 
As one social movement writer maintains, "American ideology with its 
themes of success and nationalism inhibited radicalism among American 
workers ..•. Equally important, what radical organization did develop among 
proletarians could be suppressed by the ideologically committed groups -
namely the urban middle class as a whole. ,,115 Furthermore, "these conditions 
of integration were actively strengthened by urbanization, .•• by the growth 
in cultural and political power of the society's center."1l6 
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As middle class professionals were concentrated in the cities, their 
power in social reform work also consolidated. The increasing centraliza-
tion of American power prompted the NWP to establish headquarters in 
Washington and to furthermore, push for a federal amendment. Regional 
activities, though still important in the labor movement, were not 
accomplishing goals fast enough. 
Coinciding with a period of economic distress from 1913-1915, was 
the beginning of the League's second phase. Anti-union feelings were 
rising and the potential for continued union leverage was decreasing. , 
Thus, the League was forced to shift its activities from encouraging the 
unionization of women to less threatening activities such as education and 
legislation. This is an example of a prevailing economic sit uation determi-
ning the structuring of an organization's activity. 
Another element to be considered are the traditional attitudes which 
ment held toward women and which women had internalized about themselves. 
These values shaped every aspect of these challenge groups and again, if it 
had not been for the unique circumstances surrounding the NWP, they would 
have paralleled more closely other women's reform organizations. This 
primary element which can be viewed on both the psychological and social 
level, basically determined the extent to which their self-concepts would 
hinder or encourage their political activities. 
America's involvement in World War I provides the clearest example of 
the direct relationship between societal circumstances and movement activity. 
As America's involvement in the war became imminent, many women's organi-
zations decided to drop their feminist activity and help Wilson mobilize 
the country's energies toward war work. ~s pressures for patriotism and 
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conformity were incrcnsing, dissent was n serious problcm~ In fact, 
this was a major reason why the Administration could not accept the 
NWP's demand to be treated as political prisoners. If they had, then 
perhaps war protesters would have demanded the same right and such a 
standard would have had to be institutionalized. 117 
The NWTUL, as might be expected, suspended many of their activities 
during World War I. Many of the League's leaders were subsumed under 
governmental positions and there was an overall shortage of financial 
contributions. Also, the concerns of the goverrunent were narrowed 
and channelled solely into war issues. The League respectfully accommodated 
this shift. 
The NWP though, had different plans. Alice Paul refused to suspend 
the organization's fight for suffrage with the same, if not increased, 
force. One of the things she did was to prove that suffrage was indeed 
a war issue. In an article written immediately following America's entrance 
into the war, Paul wrote, 
liThe Democrats have decided in caucus that only war 
measures shall be included in their legislative program 
and have announced that they will take up no new subjects 
unless the President considers them of value for war 
purposes. Suffrage has not yet been included under this 
head .••. No 'war measure' that has been suggested would 
contribute more toward establishing unity in the country 
than would the giving and of suffrage to all the people. 
It will always be difficult to wage a war for democracy 
abroad while democracy is denied at home ... 118 
The NAWSA was horrified by this stance and afraid that the suffrage amendment, 
so close to being passed, would suffer as a result. In a press release, 
NAWSA stated: 
"We have no sympathy with the militant tactics of the 
small 'British' group called Suffragettes. No President 
since Lincoln has had such serious and delicate problems 
to solve ••• as Mr. Wilson ••. We are distressed that any 
person in the name of our cause should have attempted to 
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intrude upon his peace of mind ... Although the denial 
of the vote to American women is a monstrous injustice, 
there is neither sense nor logic in harrying the 
President over it. ,,119 
The reason for NWP's admamant position relates again to their 
heritage. Paul remembered that at the outbreak of the Civil War, the 
Suffragists were asked to put down their suffrage work for war work. 
Susan B. Anthony complied with reluctance and hoped that they would 
receive the vote at the end of the war along with the Blacks. At that 
point, though, they were told that it was "the Negro's hour,,120 and the 
Black vote could not be jeopardized by a problematic link with women's 
suffrage. Paul did not want to repeat the same mistake and in fact used 
the war to emphasize the inconsistencies of the American political system. 
The Progressive Era structured a consciousness out of which came 
symbols and ideas for social change. Pershaps the advances which had been 
made for women in the late nineteenth century and the respectability which 
feminism could claim by the outset of the twentieth century halted further 
important gains for women. But all of this was part of an overall social 
process which_ stemmed from economic and social conditions and curbed 
activities. One need only look at the vehemence with which the government 
constrained the NWP to understand the limit to which political organiza-
tions were permitted to go. 
This period of time is intriguing because of tile following paradox: 
One of the traits of the Progressive Era was freedom of self-determination 
and self-expression: freedom from government intervention. Also typical 
of this period was a concern for the poor and the helpless. While the less 
threatening organizations indeed exemplified these characteristics, those 
which actually carried this ethic to the extreme and enacted their 'God-
given freedoms' were punished horribly for it. Janice Trecker speaks of 
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of the 'Progressive Dilemma' in reference to the irony based on America's 
encouragement of its citizens to criticize the government and to have a 
voice in its processes and, on the other hand, resisting change so adamantly 
either in subtle or overt ways.121 
The rise of the new middle class which was concentrated in the cities 
determined the membership for both organizations. The NWTUL was dominated 
by a middle and upper class ethic despite working class influences. As 
professionals with vested interests in a smooth-running, rational and 
friendly system, the middle class strata of the League c.onfined their 
efforts to activities consistent with their class interests. Their primary 
objective was social reform above all else with an emphasis on expertise 
and education. The NWTUL then, was most typically Progressive. With 
sympathetic allies encouraging working class women to understand their 
situation and to reform it, the Progressive impulse was successfully dis-
seminated. 
The NWP, although deeply ingrained in a middle class pioneering ethic, 
was the only women's organiztion during this time period to rej ect this 
'social impulse'. They fought militantly for their demands and were 
ridiculed, ignored and even violently abused. Symbolizing the radical 
women of the first feminist wave during the mid-nineteenth century) members 
of the NWP were similarly inflexible in theIr struggle and refused to allow 
anything to deter their activities. This fact is unique in light of the 
historical conditions which pressured an organizations to expand their 
goals to include broader apsects of social welfare. 
Chapter B 
Conclusion 
A few paramount issues should be restated at this point. First, 
where a particular challenge group fits into the social process is central 
to an understanding of conflict in a given society and the methods used 
to contain it. How does an authority structure legitimate its power and 
most effectively control its constituents? The Sociology of Knowledge 
provides a useful tool for comprehending the important determinants of 
challenge group action and hence, may clnrify particular causal factors 
which, if altered, will lead to social change. 
Indicative of the American mind was the way in which the authorities 
responded to challenge group discontent. At first the government ignored 
the NWP and then, realizing their threat, violently suppressed them. They 
were an alientated group on the periphery of society. The NWTUL however, 
tapped into mainstream challenge group processes, yet because of underlying 
class tensions which were never confronted directly and a binding loyalty 
to the AFL, they were never as successful as other social reform organi-
zations. 
More specifically, there are two issues which expose the basic dilemmas 
and impediments which the NWP and the NWTUL encountered. The issue of 
gender and class continually emerge in discussions of both groups. Tbe 
NWP wanted to extinguish gender differences and receive equal treatment 
with men. However, they failed to realize that their aims were not going 
to serve all women but rather, only women like themselves: privileged and 
middle class. 
Likewise, although the League highlighted gender differences in their 
second phase, they strived to conceal them and place themselves on par with 
men in their first phase. Furthermore, their middle class inability to 
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account for the limitn tions 0 [ class d if f ercnccs in the well-intended 
effort to join together,reflected their naivete and their reluctance 
to examine the existence of their own class interests~ 
By emphasizing gender distinctions, the League defeated their oppor-
tunities for rising above the elements which were oppressing them. Protective 
legislation and their stand against the ERA were examples of their emphasis 
on preferential treatment for women. However, if t~is seems at all con-
servative, one must recall the appalling working conditions and the battles 
the labor movement hali to fight to .:.ILtain what it al last did. From this 
perspective, the League was reacting to conditions beyond their control 
and as their primary aim was to help women wnge-earners, protective legis-
lation was indeed the way to do just that. 
It is fruitless to say that either of these groups succeeded or failed. 
Both improved the position of women invarious ways, the most important of 
which was that they existed, providing ways for women to enter the political 
arena. They also made errors and since the NWP took greater risks, they 
more often and more conspicuously had greater defeats. 
This takes one back to the first premise; that is, that the histories 
of the organiztions were socially-situated and were products of existential 
historical phenomena. Out of this came specific interactions between an 
authority seeking the maintenance of power and the organizations themselves 
desiring influence on the authority and change in a certain direction. 
The issues referred to above can be helpful as background to contempor-
ary subjects of thought in the woman's movement. Is it more profitable 
to de-emphasize women's biolgical structure to gain equal status with men 
or should the woman's movement accentuate those differences and build on 
them either in an alternative setting or within the established societal 
structure? 
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Likewise, is it conceivable that what is now a mainly white and 
middle class movement will ever attract minority and poor women? To 
what extent is this mainstream feminist ideology reaching out to 
non-professionals? The final question to be asked is: what degree of 
success can women hope to achieve if they neglect to provide a com-
prehensive analysis not only of patriarchy and capitalism but also 
of relevant contemporary issues which will connect the interests of 
all women and will build a broad-based movement? 
The NWP and the Nl-lTUL are interesting examples of some of the 
first attempts of women to organize with other women around political 
issues. Their different ideologies and approaches were born from 
separate sources. 
The NlVTUL's roots and energy were drawn from the Progressive Era 
and the impetus for the new middle class to work in the model of so.cial 
reform which they created. Their goals were not to separate and assert 
but to build a more fair and solid American society. 
The NWP, with its roots in a foreign country and with energy of 
young unattached women, shocked Progressive America since it chose to 
separate and assert a moral and political right for women. It certainly 
was affected by American circuIllstances but mostly insofar as they reacted 
against them. This may be a determinant as to why they ignored class 
issues; such a concern for the poor was so linked with the Progressive 
reform attitude that its exclusion from their ideology was inevitable. 
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